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I. INTRODUCTION
I read a book a while ago called I Raise My Eyes to Say Yes.1 It is
the autobiography of a woman who is quadriplegic because cerebral
palsy left her unable to move her hands or legs or to speak. Ruth
lived with her family throughout her early childhood. She communi-
cated by smiling, frowning, and making vocalizations and facial
expressions that her family recognized from early on. As her parents
aged and the strain of caring for her grew, her family placed her in a
state institution. Ruth wrote that at the institution, despite informa-
tion from her parents to the contrary:
My intake evaluation labeled me an imbecile, and thus determined
how the nurses and attendants were to treat me for the next few
years. Since everyone assumed that I couldn't understand what
was going on around me, they ignored any and all evidence that I
could present to the contrary.2
She tells the story of discovering other residents who were also
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. I acknowledge with
gratitude the invaluable research assistance of Lester Perling, Judy Klein and Carol Grant,
and the insights and suggestions of my colleagues Mary Coombs, Martha Mahoney and Wes
Daniels. Special thanks to Ira Burnim for encouragement and inspiration. Diane Ashby gave
indispensable secretarial support. This is dedicated to my mother, Gabrielle Stefan, who laid
the foundation for all that I know and believe about equality and justice (and competence):
that none of these are abstract constructs, but arise daily from the way we treat each other.
My highest aspiration is that people who know her will recognize me as her daughter.
1. RUTH SIENKIEWICZ-MERCER & STEVEN B. KAPLAN (1989).
2. Id. at 39.
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assumed to be imbeciles and of laboriously devising languages to com-
municate with them:
Theresa turned her head and nudged the yellow teddy bear lying
beside her pillow. Making quiet, gentle sounds, Theresa repeated
this gesture several times until she was certain I understood. By
indicating her teddy, the only object of affection around her, she
was telling me that she liked me very much.... I responded with
loving sounds of my own, and raised my eyes in an emphatic
"Yes!" to make sure Theresa understood that I felt the same way
about her. At that instant Theresa figured out what none of the
staff would decipher for years: that I raised my eyes to say yes.3
But the fact that Ruth could communicate with Theresa and
other residents did nothing to change her label of "imbecile" or get
her out of the institution. Staff members did not notice when patients
communicated with each other. In a very real way, these communica-
tions between patients did not "count" in staff assessments of Ruth's
capacity. Only Ruth's communications with those in power-the
staff-counted. Because she had been presented to them as an imbe-
cile, they ignored or misinterpreted her efforts to communicate with
them. One day by sheer chance two attendants discovered that Ruth
understood the conversation around her.' After this, Ruth received a
communication board that enabled her to point to letters and spell out
messages. As staff members understood her messages more clearly
from the communication board than they did from the limited reper-
toire of gestures and grimaces available to Ruth, they gave her
increasingly sophisticated communication boards and equipment.
The more assistance she was given, the better she was able to commu-
nicate with staff. The more she communicated, the more her compe-
tency was recognized in staff assessments. Today she is married and
living in the community; she used her communication board with the
assistance of a friend to compose her life story.5
3. Id. at 64-65.
4. These staff members had been very recently hired, a crucial point in their ability to be
open to the possibility that Ruth had been mislabelled. They were telling a joke about a hated
supervisor and Ruth laughed.
You should have seen the astonished expressions on their faces! First they
looked at each other, then they looked at me, then they asked each other whether
I could possibly be laughing at what they had said. This prompted me to gesture
excitedly with facial expressions and sounds, to tell them, "Yes indeed, I was
laughing at your joke." . . . Once Alice and Wessie discovered I appreciated
adult humor, they started to direct comments to me instead of just talking about
me . . . . More important, these new attitudes altered the very nature of the
attention I received.
Id. at 108-109.
5. This effort took months. The story of the collaboration and communication between
[Vol. 47:763
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Ruth's story is about the meaning and assessment of competence
and the consequences of being perceived as incompetent. The ques-
tion of competence is enormously important. Competence is a prereq-
uisite for participation in our legal and social system. Law makes the
power of individual choice legally contingent on competence. The
right to make decisions in matters such as marriage, contractual rela-
tions, voting, testamentary disposition, and health care depends on
being legally competent.
Surprisingly, nothing has been written about competence in femi-
nist legal scholarship. Competence involves issues central to feminist
theory: issues about autonomy, power and choice, and questions
about the ability to make decisions and effectuate them. The very
concept of competence, as well as the standards developed by courts
to assess competence, incorporates unquestioningly many of the
assumptions that feminist theory has worked hardest to challenge.
For example, the assumptions that incompetence inheres in the
individual, that it is identifiable by objective, empirical observations
by neutral experts, and that it is not subject to any gender distinctions
or differentiations fly in the face of feminist challenges to traditional
claims of objectivity, neutrality, and universality.6 The idea that any
concept as fundamental to law as competence could be untouched by
gender issues also runs counter to most feminist theory.7 In addition,
Ruth Sienkiewicz-Mercer and Steven Kaplan, the friend who transformed her communication-
board fragments into a whole story faithful to the author's meaning, is a moving and thought-
provoking account of the nature of communication. It cannot be summarized here with
justice. I highly recommend it. See id. at vii-xxvi. For a strikingly similar story about an
intelligent woman with cerebral palsy who was labelled profoundly mentally retarded and
spend over twenty years in an institution, see Meg Laughlin, Free at Last, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 28, 1993, Tropic Magazine, at 10.
6. See Leslie Bender, Symposium: From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using
Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1, 11 n.24, 17 (1990). Feminists
question the possibility of an aperspectival, objective position from which to assess the
situation of women. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L.
REV. 761, 769 (1990). For a particularly comprehensive summary of feminist theory across all
disciplines, including law, see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 193-224
(1990).
7. A fairly concise and representative example of the feminist critique of law is that
"rules formulated in a male-dominated society reflect male needs, male concerns and male
experience." Nadine Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1686, 1694 (1980) (reviewing
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979)); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 181, 186
(Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) ("The law sees and treats women the
way men see and treat women."); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, in id. at 201, 228-30
(maintaining that modem jurisprudence is masculine in that the values, dangers, and the
fundamental contradiction between autonomy and intimacy that characterizes women's lives
are ignored).
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there are many competence inquiries that apply solely or chiefly to
women-competence to consent to sexual intercourse,' competence
testing of women who press rape charges,9 competence to make deci-
sions about pregnancy, abortion and sterilization,' ° competence to
enter into separation and divorce agreements," and competence to
give children up for adoption.' 2
In this article I advance three principal arguments regarding gen-
der discrimination and competence.' a Part II uses traditional liberal
notions of equality to examine the application of concepts of compe-
tence to men and women and concludes that women are denied even
formal equality in this area.
Part III contends that existing legal definitions of competence
and methodologies of assessing competence are falsely based on an
assumption that competence is an inherent, objective and measurable
attribute of an individual. By contrast, I assert that questions of com-
petence arise only as a function of a relationship between two or more
people and that this relationship is necessarily a hierarchical one,
characterized by dominance and subordination, by power and
powerlessness.
Far from being an internal characteristic of an individual, com-
petence is a value judgment arising from an individual's conversation
or communication with individuals in positions of power or authority.
Essentially, a judgment of incompetence is a judgment by those in
power that the conversation has broken down. This failure of com-
munication may be due entirely to one side-a patient in a vegetative
state-or the other-a doctor who concludes that a patient is incom-
petent simply because she disagrees with his recommendation. 4
More often, the failure of communication is due to the dynamic
between the two people."5 Due to the fact that "[w]hen a system of
power is thoroughly in command, it has scarcely need to speak itself
8. See infra part IV.A.
9. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Necessity or Permissibility of Mental Examination
to Determine Competency or Credibility of Complainant in Sexual Offense Prosecution, 45
A.L.R. 4th 310 (1986).
10. See infra part IV.D.
11. See infra part IV.B.
12. See infra part IV.C.
13. I do not consider assessments of women's competence in the context of criminal
proceedings against them.
14. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (noting that
psychiatrist's opinion of patient's incompetence was based in part upon his inference from her
unwillingness to discuss a proposed operation with him that she was incapable of facing her
problems); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Presumption for Treatment: Has It Been Justified, 13
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 65 (1985); see also infra text accompanying notes 107-10.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 85-95.
[Vol. 47:763
FEMINIST THEORY AND COMPETENCE
aloud,"1 6 the whole focus of a competence inquiry centers on the
alleged incompetent person to the exclusion of the powerful side of
the dialogue. Therefore, incompetence is seen as the attribute of the
less powerful person and all failures of communication are attributed
to her.
Part IV argues that the concept of incompetence constructs and
perpetuates a false social and legal vision of competent women and
the world that competent women are supposed to live in. The law
presumes competence. Competence presumes autonomy and freedom
of will and action. Therefore, women's powerlessness must fit into
one of two very separate and distinct legal doctrines in order to be
cognizable at law. On the one hand, lack of competence or capacity
due to completely internal deficiencies readily operates under law to
relieve an individual of the burdens of a decision she is understood not
to have made as an exercise of her own will. On the other hand, the
law also recognizes coercion or duress-totally external compulsion
generated by an identifiable individual or group-as a situation where
an individual is robbed of power and autonomy in decisionmaking.
The compartmentalization and doctrinal distinctions between these
two categories dilute and distort women's experience of powerless-
ness, allow the law to play off one category against the other, and
result in much of women's actual experience falling through the doc-
trinal abyss between the two categories. This vision results in an
absence of legal remedies for many of the injuries that damage women
most.
II. COMPETENCE AND FORMAL INEQUALITY
Competence doctrine embodies a classical liberal legal perspec-
tive.1" From that perspective, competence doctrine on its face
presents few issues of particular concern to women. Theoretically,
women are equal to men, entitled to the same presumptions of compe-
16. KATE MILLETr, SEXUAL POLITIcs 87 (1971), quoted in Catharine MacKinnon,
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1324 (1991).
17. By classical liberal legal perspective, I mean the perspective that reflects in law the
central assumptions of the classical liberal tradition of Hobbes, Locke and Hume:
[T]he notion that values are subjective and derive from personal desire, and that
therefore ethical discourse is conducted profitably only in instrumental terms; the
view that society is an artificial aggregation of autonomous individuals; the
separation in political philosophy between public and private interest, between
state and civil society; and a commitment to a formal or procedural rather than a
substantive conception of justice.
Karl Klare, Law Making as Praxis, TELOS, Summer 1979, at 123, 132 n.28 (1979), quoted in
Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REv. 387,
400 n.62 (1984).
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tence 18 and tested by the same evaluations and instruments. Women's
capacity to make health care decisions, enter into contracts, and
devise property are evaluated as men's competence would be evalu-
ated, according to the same legal standards. This is the current
understanding of competence: both the concept and its application
are essentially gender neutral. Yet the application and assessment of
competence by both professionals and courts exhibit gender bias that
would trouble even those who look primarily to formal equality19 to
decide whether a given doctrine or area of the law disadvantages
women.
Women are dramatically overrepresented as subjects in both
guardianship and conservatorship proceedings.20 Studies uniformly
show a statistically significant proportion of women under guardian-
ship, even after figures are adjusted to reflect women's greater repre-
sentation among the population of older people in the state or region
surveyed.21 A recent ten-state survey found that in Florida, for exam-
ple, 70% of the guardianship appointments for persons over sixty are
for women.22 In the other nine states, the figures were similar. On
average, 67% of the guardianship appointments were for women.23
Another recent study conducted in the city and county of St. Louis,
Missouri found that between 72% and 74% of those subject to a
"guardianship - conservatorship" over a three year period were
women. 24 These recent figures also parallel those of an earlier study
18. This has not always been the predominant view on the matter. For example, "many
nineteenth century Americans believed slaves, immigrants, and also women lacked the
capacity to decide upon their own medical treatment." Martin S. Pernick, The Patient's Role
in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 23 (President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research ed., 1982). The cases discussed by Pernick involved involuntary administration of
anaesthesia to women patients. Id.
19. Formal equality has been defined as "equality in the abstract, legal sense." See Olsen,
supra note 17, at 391 n.14.
20. Final Report, Center for Social Gerontology, Dep't of Health and Human Services,
Grant No. 90-AR-0124, National Study for Guardianship System and Feasibility of
Implementing Expert Systems, August 31, 1992 (forthcoming study 1992) [hereinafter Final
Report]. Older women are at particular peril because of the traditional view of women as
dependent and unable to manage their own affairs. See MARSHALL B. KAPP & ARTHUR
BIGOT, GERIATRICS AND THE LAW 88 (1985).
21. Figures indicate that 40.28% of people over 65 are men while 59.72% are women.
U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1992, Table 12.
22. Final Report, supra note 20.
23. Id.
24. George H. Zimney et al., Annual Reports by Guardians and Conservators to Probate
Courts, 3 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 61, 66 (1991). The figures for 1985, 1986, and 1987
were 74%, 73% and 72% respectively. Id. at 66.
[Vol. 47:763
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cited by the United States House of Representatives which found that
67% of guardianships in a nation-wide survey of 2200 cases were
women.
25
Women are also underrepresented as guardians. While few sta-
tistics are kept on the gender of court-appointed guardians, 26 my own
investigation of forty-four right to die cases revealed that of the forty
cases where a guardian ad litem (G.A.L.) was appointed, thirty-one
were male, six were female, and in four cases the gender of the G.A.L.
was not ascertainable. 27 In the remaining seventeen cases that I inves-
tigated, the patients' family members or previously selected or
appointed guardians or conservators spoke for the patients. Choice of
guardians in conservatorship proceedings is probably discriminatory
along a variety of dimensions.28
Unequal applications of competence law are not limited to
guardianships. Case law in areas that might appear gender neutral on
the surface shows distinctly different analysis by courts depending on
the gender of the individual in question. Health care court decisions
that have been traditionally regarded as gender neutral in fact reflect
gendered approaches and outcomes.
25. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND LONG TERM CARE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON AGING, ABUSES OF GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ELDERLY AND INFIRM: A NATIONAL
DISGRACE, H.R. Doc. No. 639, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1987) (citing to Associated Press
study).
26. For example, "[i]n order to discover the percentage of women who have been
appointed to these positions [in New York] one would have to wade through a three inch thick
stack of paper, hand-counting the female names. This has been done ... only 21% go to
women." Marilyn Fitterman & Noreen Connell, More Power to Women in the Courts,
NEWSDAY, December 20, 1988 at 65.
27. The reason that there is one more G.A.L. than there are cases is that in one case, In re
Lawrence, 579 N.E.2d 32, 36 (Ind. 1991), the court appointed two successive guardians ad
litem, one female and one male. Five of the six female G.A.L.s were appointed to represent
female patients; the thirty-one male guardians ad litem represented twenty females and eleven
males.
28. One such dimension is sexual preference. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski,
382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). The court in Kowalski denied guardianship of an
injured woman to her lesbian lover. Id. Eventually, the court awarded guardianship to the
lover. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). For a good
discussions of the Kowalski case, see Amy L. Brown, Note, Broadening Anachronistic Notions
of Family in Proxy Decisionmaking for Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 1029 (1990) and
David Link, Note, The Tie That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the "Family" Commitments
of Same Sex Couples, 23 Loy. L. A. L. REV. 1055, 1134-39 (1990). A durable power of
attorney may help to preserve the relationship between gay couples. Some states, however,
limit who may be appointed as an attorney in fact in ways that would exclude same sex
partners. Additionally, the family may legally challenge these appointments. See Ruthann
Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory,
63 TEMP. L. REV. 511, 516-17 (1990).
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A. Health Care and the Right to Die
The right to die has received enormous attention in the seventeen
years since the Quinlan29 case first gained national attention.30
Authors and scholars frame the right to die issue as involving individ-
ual autonomy in the face of an impersonal and dehumanizing medical
technology;3  as blurring previously recognized boundaries between
life and death32 and between suicide and "natural" death;33 as a con-
test for control between the medical and legal establishment; 34 or as
an example of the need for ethicists to add their voices to the debate.35
Until 1990, not a single article examined right to die cases to deter-
mine whether gender might play a part in the outcome or analysis of
those cases.
In 1990, Steven Miles and Allison August reviewed over thirty
cases concerning the right to die of once-competent individuals.36
29. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976). Karen Quinlan was in a "chronic vegetative state" on life support when
her father sought to have himself appointed her guardian with authority to terminate life
support over the objection of her physician who expressed concern that to do so would violate
medical practice and ethics. Id. at 657. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the father's
petition. Id. at 671. Karen Quinlan continued to live without life support for nine years,
although she never emerged from her vegetative state. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d
408, 413 n.6 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
30. The Quinlan case continues to receive attention. See discussions see George J.
Alexander, Time for a New Law on Health Care Advance Directives, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 755
(1991); Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, Experimenting with the "Right to Die" in the
Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REV. 1253 (1991); Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests
Standard: A Comparison of The State's Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in the
Best Interests Determinations for Children and Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283
(1991); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Planning for Health Care Using Living Wills and Durable
Powers of Attorney: A Guide for the South Carolina Attorney, 42 S.C. L. REV. 525 (1991).
31. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, The Sirens' Lure of Invented Consent: A
Critique of Autonomy-Based Surrogate Decision Making for Legally-Incapacitated Older
Persons, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 859 (1991); G. Steven Neeley, Patient Autonomy and State
Intervention: Reexamining the State's Purported Interest, 19 N. Ky. L. REV. 235 (1992).
32. See Debra L. Dippel, Note, Someone to Watch Over Me: Medical Decision-Making for
Hopelessly Ill Incompetent Adult Patients, 24 AKRON L. REV. 639 (1991).
33. See Edward R. Grant & Cathleen A. Cleaver, A Line Less Reasonable: Cruzan and
The Looming Debate Over Active Euthanasia, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (1991); Yale
Kamisar, When is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When is There No Constitutional
"Right to Live'?, 25 GA. L. REV. 1203 (1991).
34. See Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1121 (1991);
Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia: Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of... Time," 53 U. PITT.
L. REV. (1991).
35. See Ben A. Rich, The Values History: A New Standard of Care, 40 EMORY L.J. 1109
(1991); Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of
Caring, 50 MD. L. REV. 798 (1991),
36. Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and the "Right to Die," 18 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 85 (1990). The cases reviewed by Miles and August are distinguished
from those cases involving institutionalized severely retarded people who were never
FEMINIST THEORY AND COMPETENCE
Miles and August found that, depending on the gender of the incom-
petent patient, right to die cases reflected two very different styles of
judicial reasoning and outcome. For example, courts treated previ-
ously expressed opinions about life support differently depending on
the gender of the speaker. Men's opinions were seen as thoughtful
and rational: Mr. Brophy "reached a judgment; ' 37 Mr. Delio, called
a doctor of philosophy by the courts, (his Ph.D. was in exercise physi-
ology), expressed a "deeply held, solemn, intelligent determination; 38
and twenty-three year old Mr. Gardner was "very serious."' 39 By con-
trast, the Supreme Court of Maine in In re Swan 4I called a seventeen
year old boy's expressions "serious and deliberative"'" as well as
"valid." 42
Women, on the other hand, were portrayed as unreflective, emo-
tional or immature: thirty-one year old Ms. Jobe's statements were
"offhand remark[s] made by a person when young."'43 In Cruzan v.
Harmon," a case involving a thirty year-old comatose woman, the
Missouri Supreme Court quoted language from In re Jobes to charac-
terize Nancy Cruzan's expressed beliefs about life support as "infor-
mally expressed reactions to other people's medical condition and
treatment"45 which were "remote, general, spontaneous, and made in
casual circumstances. '46 The dissent in Cruzan noted that there was
much more testimony in the record concerning Ms. Cruzan's wishes
than the majority's opinion recognized.47 The testimony about Nancy
Cruzan's expressed opinions, ignored by the majority in Cruzan, was
very similar to that given effect in Swan.48 In the Quinlan case itself,
the court discounted Karen Quinlan's statements that she would not
want to be kept on life support because "the conversations with her
mother and friends were theoretical ones. She was not personally
competent. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d 417 (Mass.
1977).
37. Miles & August, supra note 36, at 87.
38. Id. at 88.
39. Id. at 87.
40. 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1203.
43. Miles & August, supra note 36, at 88.
44. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
45. Id. at 424 (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (N.J. 1987)).
46. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan called Cruzan's statements concerning life
support "similarly unreliable." Id.
47. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 436 (Higgins, J., dissenting); see also id. at 443 (Higgins, J.,
dissenting from order denying rehearing).
48. Compare id. at 443 (Higgins, J. dissenting from order denying rehearing) with Swan,
569 A.2d at 1205.
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involved."4 On the other hand, judges have also rejected a woman's
past statements that she did not want to be kept on life support
because those statements were based on personal involvement with
people on life support.50
What is the source of this disparity in court decisions? The
answer is not simply that women's words and declarations are taken
less seriously than men's, although there is evidence from other fields
that this is the case.51 Courts' doubts and decisions about capacity are
likely to reflect ingrained assumptions about the appropriate process
and result of decisionmaking.52 To the extent that women employ
different processes and pursue different values in decisionmaking,53
these differences may affect courts' judgments about women's
competence.
Competence doctrine presumes that the individual is capable of
making a rational decision54 and competence is equated with rational-
ity.55 Women have long been portrayed and perceived as irrational,
as incapable of objectivity or of engaging in reasoned decisionmak-
ing.56 Courts express strong ideas about what constitutes rational
49. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 819 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979).
50. In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., 532 N.Y.S.2d 133, 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)
(Brown, J., dissenting); see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
51. See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND
MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990).
52. Miles & August, supra note 36, at 91-92; see also Bernard Lo, Assessing Decision-
Making Capacity, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 193, 195-96 (1990).
53. Several authors have presented evidence regarding these differences in decisionmaking.
See, e.g., MARY FIELD BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING (1986); CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). But see William J. Friedman et al., Sex
Differences in Moral Judgments? A Test of Gilligan's Theory, 11 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN Q.
37 (1987); Kathleen M. Galotti, Gender Differences in Self-Reported Moral Reasoning: A
Review and New Evidence, 18 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 475 (1989).
54. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
83 (3d. ed. 1989); John W. Parry & James C. Beck, Revisiting the Civil Commitment!
Involuntary Treatment Stalemate Using Limited Guardianship, Substituted Judgment and
Different Due Process Considerations: A Work in Progress, 14 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 102, 105 (1990).
55. "Capacity means the mental ability to make a rational decision .... State Dep't of
Human Serv. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); see also Flick, supra
note 34, at 1136. Flick, a doctor, states (without citation) that "it is not any decision that
should be respected, but rather decisions judged to be rational, those based on adequate
information." Id.
56. Although this observation hardly needs a footnote, the following both support this
point and make for fascinating reading. Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of
Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 812-817 (1990) (tracing history of construction of women as
irrational beginning with Aristotle); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV.
797, 804 (1989) (noting that historically women were seen as creatures of "fundamental
irrationality [unable] to engage in rigorous, abstract thinking").
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decisionmaking.17 For example, Miles and August suggest that
because women may employ care-centered or communal moral rea-
soning to make decisions rather than affirming generalizable moral
rules, their expressions of preference to be removed from life support
in the event of their incompetence will be discounted by courts.58
These courts will view an incompetent person's history of communal
moral reasoning as inarticulate or immature in its failure to assert
generalizable moral imperatives.59 In addition, some courts view with
suspicion decisions based on emotion or experience, even experience
directly relevant to the circumstances at issue. For example, one
judge rejected a woman's stated preference not to be kept alive on life
support because after caring for her husband and two brothers in their
terminal illnesses she based her decision on her own experience and
her empathetic reaction to the experience of others:
While Mrs. O'Connor may have expressed a desire to forego the
use of artificial means of life support, there was no indication that
she had carefully reflected on the subject. While Mrs. O'Connor's
statements may not have been "casual remarks," they were made
at a time when she had recently experienced the loss of a loved one
or shortly after her own hospitalization and may have reflected an
emotional reaction to a perceived fear rather than a solemn pro-
nouncement or clearly expressed decision regarding a future course
of medical treatment.6°
The classical liberal ideology from which competence doctrine
springs is characterized by a "presumption of an essentially selfish
human (male) actor and ... presumptively selfish choices."'6' Cases
involving decisions that are selfish may be more easily seen as the
product of the rational deliberation of a competent person than deci-
sions that involve self-sacrifice. For example, in the past, courts rou-
tinely overrode women's refusals of blood transfusions, not because of
doubts about competence but because the women were pregnant or
57. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233-34 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). In Lane,
the lower court judge decided a woman was incompetent because he "was not satisfied that
[she] arrived at her decision in a rational manner, i.e. 'after careful consideration of the
medical alternatives.'" Id. at 1234.
58. Miles & August, supra note 36, at 92.
59. Id.
60. In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., 532 N.Y.S.2d 133, 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)
(Brown, J. dissenting) (citation omitted). Interestingly, Justice Brown's observation that Mrs.
O'Connor's statements were made when "she had recently experienced the death of a loved
one" are unsupported by the record. Id. at 138. Her husband died in 1967 and her brothers in
1975 and 1977. Id. at 135. The statements at issue were made in 1969, 1973 or 1974, and
1984. Id.
61. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 92-93 (1987).
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were mothers.62 Courts now regularly cite language of individualism,
autonomy and personal rights to uphold those decisions.63  At the
same time, however, judges are more willing to find incompetent
those women who are willing to risk their lives or health in order to
have babies.64 These cases suggest that courts may find that certain
kinds of decisions-oriented to self and rights-reflect capacity more
readily than decisions that involve self-sacrifice. If so, this might have
a disproportionate effect on judgments regarding women's capacity.
Judges also bring their values quite overtly to competence pro-
ceedings. It is interesting to see the use to which judges put ostensibly
gender neutral concepts. For example, an individual can be compe-
tent for the purposes of making some decisions, while incompetent for
the purposes of making others.65 While this reflects an approach
more attuned to the reality of people's lives-someone may not be
able to handle finances but be capable of deciding where to live-it is
used all too often to ratify decisions with which judges agree and to
sweep aside choices that conflict with judges' values.
Courts assess competence quite blatantly in terms of the desira-
bility of the outcome reflected by the challenged decision. Women
62. See, e.g., Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), reh'g en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied
sub nom. Jones v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 337 U.S. 978 (1964)
(noting that the state had an interest in preserving life of mother of seven-month-old child
sufficient to authorize order for transfusion despite mother's refusal based on religious belief);
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (holding that unborn child is entitled to law's protection and
that an order to insure blood transfusions to the mother was appropriate where deemed
necessary by physician in charge). Interestingly, when a man with children refused a blood
transfusion, the court's attention focused on whether the man had materially provided for his
children. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972).
63. Eg., Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA
1987), aff'd, 541 So. 2d 96 (1989) (noting that individual has "fundamental right to be left
alone"); Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991) (explaining that free choice
and self-determination are "fundamental constituents of life"); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551
N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990) (noting that the primary function of the state is to preserve and
promote individual liberty and personal autonomy); cf In re Guardianship of Browning, 568
So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (observing that privacy in the context of refusing life preserving medical
treatment is defined as autonomy over personal identity); Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E. 2d 395 (Mass.
1983) (vacating order requiring a wife to have a surgical procedure to "hold" a pregnancy over
her religious objections based upon her personal constitutional rights). But see Application of
Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 490 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (citing Georgetown
College, 331 F.2d at 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) with approval); Application of Jamaica Hosp., 491
N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (noting that state's right in protecting midterm fetus
outweighs the patient's right to refuse a transfusion).
64. See, e.g., In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1990); Lefebvre v. North Broward Hosp.
Dist., 566 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); see also infra text accompanying notes 248-54 for
further discussion of these cases.
65. DONALD VAN DE VEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 346-47 (1986).
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who are described in identical terms are judged incompetent in some
cases but competent in others. For example, in cases involving the
question of competence to consent to sexual intercourse,66 mentally
retarded women are routinely found incompetent. Mentally retarded
women with similar I.Q.'s and functional capacities are equally rou-
tinely found competent in cases involving the capacity to consent to
give up a child for adoption.6 This is particularly well-illustrated in
one case where the court determined that the same woman was com-
petent to marry and to give up her children for adoption, but was not
competent to consent to sexual intercourse with a man who was not
her husband.68 The court stated:
Concerning the woman's capability to consent to marriage and sex-
ual relations with her spouse, understandably the law has granted
leeway so that even persons of limited intelligence, such as this
woman and her husband, may exercise their constitutionally recog-
nized right to marry and procreate. Marriage has long been favor-
ably recognized in our society as one of the fundamental
institutions upon which our society is founded.... The same can-
not be said about non-marital sexual relations which are not con-
sidered by society in a favorable light, in part because of the
difficult consequences that may follow .....6
As to the apparent anomaly of finding the woman competent to con-
sent to the adoption of her daughter, but not to sexual intercourse
with the defendant, the court was even less concerned with consis-
tency as reflected in its statement that:
It is apparent that it was precisely the woman's lack of mental
capabilities.., that had a great deal to do with the decision of the
court to terminate her parental rights. Thus, it is of little import
that she was apparently deemed capable of legally consenting in a
different proceeding to the termination of her parental rights to her
child, and yet be found by the jury in this case not to be capable of
legally consenting to non-marital sexual intercourse ... .70
This case and others"' reflect a particularly interesting result of
the apparently neutral and salutary doctrine that a person can be
determined to be competent for some purposes and not for others.
66. See infra part IV.A.
67. See infra part IV.C.
68. State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109 (Idaho 1990).
69. Id. at 114.
70. Id. at 114-15.
71. See, e.g., In re Burbanks, 310 N.W.2d 138, 143, 151 (Neb. 1981) (noting that Multi-
County Social Service Unit testified that parents did not have mental capability to be parents
yet "assisted in the processing of legal instruments executed by the allegedly mentally deficient
parents to authorize Shiela to have an abortion and for Shiela to be sterilized."). Id. at 151.
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In summary, women do figure disproportionately high among
those who are found incompetent, while men figure disproportion-
ately high among guardians. In addition, the values of objectivity,
distance and self-interest embedded in concepts of rational decision-
making and rational outcomes probably work against women in com-
petence hearings.
The preceding analysis is not a critique of the competence para-
digm itself but only an assertion that an otherwise neutral concept has
been infected by sexism in its application. The examples above might
be corrected by more sensitive application of the competence para-
digm. The problem identified in the right to die and health care cases
could be solved by giving women's words the same credibility as
men's words. Formal equality, however, cannot remedy the principal
flaws of the concept of competence.
III. COMPETENCE AS A DYNAMIC: GENDER IMPLICATIONS OF
COMPETENCE TESTING AND ASSESSMENT
Applying equality analysis to the doctrine of competence over-
looks a number of problems. First, as I have already suggested, the
concept itself rests on a foundation of assumptions about individuals
and how they relate to society that distorts reality to the disadvantage
of powerless people in general and women in particular. Competence
law reflects this distortion in many ways. In this Part, I discuss the
law's blindness to the social and political dynamics associated with a
charge of incompetence and the process of assessing this charge. I
suggest that the paradigm of competence itself and the methods of
assessment used are flawed.
Incompetence is legally constructed as a characteristic of an indi-
vidual, brought about by forces internal to the individual, such as
"mental illness, mental retardation, senility, [or] excessive use of
drugs or alcohol"72 that render the individual incapable of decision-
making, self-care, or management of property.73 Experts measure
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 86.041 (West 1992). Many other states use similar constructs.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-2A-20 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5101 (1991); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 28-65-101 (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-28-17-4 (Bums 1991);
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-34.1 (Michie 1949-1992). Tests for competency are applicable to cases
of mental illness, mental retardation/developmental disability, physical disability, advancing
age, alcoholism, drug addiction, or any infirmity. See John Parry, Incompetency,
Guardianship, and Restoration, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 369, 372-73
(Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 1985); see also FAY A. RozoVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE, § 1.6 at 21 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that mental illness, shock, crippling
physical injury or illness, or substance abuse are all reasons for incapacity).
73. An incapacity determination requires a finding that the respondent is unable to make
or communicate decisions with regard to care for self or property. See STEPHEN J. ANDERER,
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incompetence by using professional instruments such as question-
naires and tests.74 While different tests for competence have been pro-
posed,"7 each approach focuses on the qualities or capabilities of the
alleged incompetent.76 For example, one text defines competence as
DETERMINING COMPETENCY IN GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS 22 (1990). Furthermore,
"[c]ompetency is defined as the ability of individuals to know and understand the nature and
consequences of the legal proceedings in which they are involved or the medical situations
confronting them." (emphasis added). Robert L. Sadoff, Medical-Legal Issues, in
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 637, 639 (Joel Sodavoy et al. eds.,
1991). The critical points in assessing a patient's capacity to make health care decisions are the
patient's ability to understand the proposed treatment; her ability to make a choice and her
ability to communicate that decision. ROBERT I. SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW 105 (1987); see also Benjamin Freedman, Competence, Marginal and Otherwise:
Concepts and Ethics 4 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 53, 64 (1981) (praising a criterion for
competency because it is dependent upon characteristics of the "person himself"); Bernard Lo,
Assessing Decision-Making Capacity, 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 193, 194 (1990) ("The term
incapacity is used to refer to assessments by physicians that patients lack the ability to make
informed decisions about their health care."); Barbara A. Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized
Persons, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251, 291 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds.,
1985) (noting that clinical competency means that a person understands to what he is being
asked to consent).
74. Assessment instruments can be useful in identifying functional deficits. See ANDERER,
supra note 73, at 20; see also THOMAS GRISso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES (1986)
(reviewing various competency questions that can be addressed by clinical assessment); Paul S.
Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to Treatment, 319
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1637 (1988) (noting that capacity can be assessed by asking
questions that elicit signs of the patient's abilities in key areas); M. Powell Lawton & Elaine M.
Brody, Assessment of Older People: Self-Maintaining and Instrumental Activities of Daily
Living, 9 GERONTOLOGIST 179, 179 (1969) ("The functioning human being may thus be
assessed by measuring instruments designed to tap representative behavior at each level and
within the range of competence appropriate to the individual."). In the views of attorneys,
guardians, and judges cognitive capacity may be reflected by coherent speech. Thomas G.
Gutheil & Harold Bursztajn, Clinicians' Guidelines for Assessing and Presenting Subtle Forms
of Patient Incompetence in Legal Settings, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1020, 1020 (1986).
However, "competency is presumed as long as the patient modulates his or her behavior, talks
in a comprehensible way, remembers what he or she is told .... Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of
Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 282 (1977) (emphasis
added).
75. The range of measures used to assess competency is vast. Iseli K. Krauss & Samuel J.
Popkin, Competence Issues in Older Adults, in TESTING OLDER ADULTS 277 (Thelma Hunt et
al. eds., 1989); see also LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE ELDERLY, DECISION-MAKING,
INCAPACITY, AND THE ELDERLY 108 (1987) (advocating use of mental status exam for
determinations of incapacity); GRISSO, supra note 74, at 325 (reviewing different instruments
available to assess individual's functional abilities); Gerald K. Goodenough, The Lack of
Objectivity of Physician Evaluations in Geriatric Guardianship Cases, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 53, 56
(1988) (listing several alternative testing instruments); Jeffrey S. Janofsky et al., The Hopkins
Competency Assessment Test: A Brief Method for Evaluating Patients' Capacity to Give
Informed Consent, 43 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 132 (1992); John R. Murphy, Older
Clients of Questionable Competency: Making Accurate Competency Determinations Through
the Utilization of Medical Professionals, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 899, 908 (1991) ("The focus
of most recognized judicial tests of mental competency is on the state of the client's mind.")
(emphasis added).
76. PAUL APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT 84, 87 (1987). The concept of
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"a capacity to take in, process, assimilate, and employ information in
guiding a decision." ' 7
However, some literature in the field of competence evaluation,
as well as legal scholarship in other areas, suggests that the process of
questioning and evaluating a person's competence is not so straight-
forward. Instead, this process is a matter of both interpersonal
dynamics and social and political structuring of roles and communi-
cation. Anthropologists and historians have "explored the key ques-
tion of whether competence is the creation of cultural systems and
political, social and economic arrangements. '78  Psychologists and
psychiatrists have recognized for many years that "a patient's compe-
tence can be so powerfully affected by the quality of the doctor-
patient relationship as to be almost wholly contingent upon it... [so
that] competence assessment is a process shaped by the relationship
between therapist and patient. ' 79 Some of the most fascinating work
in exposing the construction of incompetence from social interactions
has been done by James Holstein, a sociologist, who argues that
"many of the putative documents of competence or incompetence that
are considered characteristic or 'symptomatic' of individuals' mental
conditions can be analyzed as interactional accomplishments."' 0
Recently, legal scholars in other fields have begun to parallel this
work. Martha Minow's important work developing the social rela-
tions approach to law8 l helps to underscore the assertion that incom-
petence is actually not a fixed status or intrinsic difference on the part
of the allegedly incompetent person. Minow exposes the assumption
"that 'differences' are intrinsic, rather than.., expressions of compar-
general incompetence creates a competence/incompetence dichotomy. Either an individual
fits into one category for all purposes (i.e. he is incompetent to vote, make a will, manage
finances, etc.) or the individual is competent in all respects. Specific incompetence is the
principle that an individual can be competent for one specific purpose, but not another (i.e., he
is competent to vote, but not to manage finances).
77. DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 73 (Thomas G. Gutheil et al. eds.,
1991).
78. David A. Gerber, Listening to Disabled People: The Problem of Voice and Authority
quoted in Robert B. Edgerton's The Cloak of Competence, 5 DISABILITY, HANDICAP AND
SOCIETY 3, 6 (1990). Gerber states that "much current research.., conceives of most mental
retardation as a social constructed syndrome, highly variable across time and space" (citations
omitted). Id. at 6. For further insight into this concept, see Steven Schwartz, Abolishing
Competency as a Construction of Difference: A Radical Proposal to Promote the Equality of
Persons with Disabilities, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 867 (1993). Gerber notes the opposing view
that research "will ultimately reveal baseline conceptions of competence common to all
cultures and societies." Gerber, supra, at 6.
79. DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra note 77, at 162.
80. James A. Holstein, Court Ordered Incompetence: Conversational Organization in
Involuntary Commitment Hearings, 35 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 458, 459 (1988) (emphasis added).
81. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1992).
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isons between people." 82 She suggests that few characteristics are
immutably located in an individual, but rather that judgments about
difference come about as a matter of social relationships.8 3 Determi-
nations of competence cannot simply be the result of a series of obser-
vations or assessments and tests administered by an objective expert.
Rather, as Holstein notes, "attributions of mental competence or
incompetence are produced and sustained through interactional
processes .... 4
Lack of competence is perceived, assessed, and judged by others.
Competence inquiries generally arise in the context of some form of
breakdown in communications. These communications are largely
about values.8 5 Therefore, judgments about competence will vary
depending on the roles, values, characteristics and gender8 6 of the
people involved in perceiving, assessing and ultimately determining
incompetence, as well as the people whose competence is assessed. If
the person assigned to determine competence is of similar socio-eco-
nomic class and background as the person whose competence is
assessed, the quality of the interaction is enhanced.87 The quality of
the interaction may also vary greatly depending on the setting.8 8
Some psychiatrists and social scientists acknowledge the signifi-
cance of the dynamic between the assessor and the alleged incompe-
tent as a determining factor in whether an individual is labelled
incompetent. For example, one text notes that "[w]hat may be
obscured by the notion of competence as a capacity . . . residing
82. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 32 (1987).
83. Id. at 22-23.
84. Holstein, supra note 80, at 458.
85. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 54, at 83-84; Loretta M. Kopelman, On the
Evaluative Nature of Competency and Capacity Judgments, 13 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 309,
310 (1990); see also APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 76, at 85. As Appelbaum notes, "the
personal identity and professional allegiance of the tester [of competence] play an influential
role. If the tester is a physician or other clinician, health values may receive great weight." Id.
86. Gender influences judgments based on interpretation of speech. Numerous linguistic
studies have demonstrated that
[W]omen and men are judged differently even if they speak the same way....
[Wlhen women used tag questions and disclaimers, subjects judged them as less
intelligent and knowledgeable than men who also used them. When women did
not give support for their arguments, they were judged less intelligent and
knowledgeable, but men who advanced arguments without support were not.
TANNEN, supra note 51, at 228 (emphasis in original).
87. See Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the Experts: From Deference to Abdication
Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 658 (1992).
88. A person who is tested for competency in an unfamiliar environment may do
significantly worse on the evaluation simply because of the anxiety generated by being removed
from familiar surroundings. Stephen J. Anderer, A Model for Determining Competency in
Guardianship, 14 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 107, 109 (1990).
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within the person is the fact that its assessment--ostensibly a measure
of the patient's status, like the measurement of blood pressure-is
itself a bipersonal process." 9 Because in many cases there is no for-
mal or widely employed standard for measuring a person's
competence,
the relative rigor of [the assessor's] own standard, the degree of
intuitive empathy that he brings to the measurement, his own idio-
syncratic sense of what faculties in the patient are required for
competence-all play a role in his determination.
The assessor's clinical skills and sensitivity in eliciting infor-
mation also influence the results of a competence assessment. The
evaluator who is brusque, intimidating, unsympathetic or uncom-
promising may impair the patient's performance.
Thus, the patient's competence may be influenced or even
impaired by the person performing the assessment. That person's
style and personality may also impinge in various ways on the task
of assessment. Clearly, then, competence assessment is a form of
decision making that is interactive, partaking of various levels of
communication (verbal and nonverbal) between patient and
physician.9 °
These observations, however, are never incorporated in court
decisions about competence or incompetence. At each of these levels
of communication, "we treat the perspective of the person doing the
seeing or judging as objective, rather than as subjective." '9
A series of relational and communication tests confronts a per-
son undergoing a competence assessment. The primary dynamic is
between the individual and the person who alleges or assumes incom-
petence. For example, the attorney who raises the issue of his client's
competence92 or the doctor in a health care situation who turns to the
89. DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra note 77, at 73. The
measure of blood pressure itself, of course, could vary depending on the nature of the
interaction between the patient and the person taking the blood pressure. See T.G. Pickering
et al., How Common is White Coat Hypertension?, 259 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 225 (1988). In
assessments of competence, the nature of the interaction between the examiner and the
examined is even more crucial in determining the outcome.
90. DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra note 77, at 73-74. For
many years Roesch and Golding in their work on assessing competence to stand trial have
recognized the importance of examining the dynamics between the defendant and his or her
attorney. See RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 89
(1980); see also Anderer, supra note 88, at 109.
91. Minow, supra note 82, at 32.
92. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that a lawyer suspecting that his
client "suffers a disability" such that she is legally incapacitated should see that a legal
representative is appointed. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmt.
(1983).
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court for permission to medicate a patient against his will 93 are the
primary actors raising the issue of competence.
If a problem in communication between the primary actor and
the allegedly incompetent person is brought to the attention of the
court, there is inevitably a second communications test set up involv-
ing an expert who is appointed to assess the individual's competence.
Although this expert could logically be assigned to observe the inter-
actions between the primary actor and the person alleged to be incom-
petent, as well as asked to analyze the origins of the deficit in
communications, the focus of the inquiry is totally on the allegedly
incompetent person. The primary actor, and his or her contributions
to the communication problem, fade out of the picture. The court-
appointed expert is seen as a judge, rather than as a mediator. Once
again, a failure of communication between the expert and the alleg-
edly incompetent person will invariably be attributed to the latter.
This expert is almost always a stranger to the alleged incompetent,
who has no choice in the selection of the expert, the setting of the
inquiry, the course of the conversation or the instruments used to
assess competence. Yet both the setting and the identity of the expert
assessing competence may have a substantial impact on the outcome
of the assessment. 94 For example, there may be a difference between
what a person is willing to share with a clinician and what he will
share with his attorney. Testimony in a courtroom will differ from
interviews in an office. Both will differ from conversation at home.
A person whose competence is challenged will face a third
dynamic: the court hearing. There the individual may try to commu-
nicate with the judge to establish her competence. It is clear that
courts are looking for demonstrations of communications skills in
making decisions relating to competence. "Judges .. .infer compe-
tence and incompetence from the way patients deliver their testimony.
That is, they attend to the form of patients' courtroom conversation
for what they believe are indicators of interactional abilities or dys-
functions.... Judges thus infer incompetence ... from such conver-
93. E.g., Guardianship of Roe, 583 N.E.2d 1282 (Mass. 1992). Although Roe testified
that he did not want medication because of concern that it causes tardive dyskinesia, and
although Roe in fact had tardive dyskinesia, the court granted the mental health department's
petition to declare him incompetent to make treatment decisions because he denied he had
mental illness. Furthermore, the court found that if he were competent, he would have wanted
to take the medication at issue. Id. at 1284-85; see also In re Mary Ann D., 578 N.Y.S.2d 622
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992). In Mary Ann D. the court affirmed a decision that granted a
psychiatric center's petition to forcibly administer lithium by nasogastric tube, finding that the
patient's inability "to discuss her treatment with her psychiatrist" was one indication of her
lack of competence. Id. at 623.
94. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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sational difficulties and failures."95 Therefore, when capacity is
questioned and assessed, there are potentially three different sets of
communications tests, each focused solely on the allegedly incompe-
tent person and each more formalized and potentially intimidating
than the last.
If the insights that "competence does not 'reside' in the patient
alone"96 and "competence assessment is a process shaped by the rela-
tionship between therapist and patient" 97 were sufficient, three layers
of inquiry might be preferable to one. Presumably, interviews by dis-
interested professionals and an assessment by an impartial court
would serve to guard against suggestions of incompetence arising
from family members with conflicts of interest or professionals whose
recommendations had been challenged or flouted. In reality this is
not what occurs. Competence assessments are not simply conversa-
tions between equal parties trying to understand each other. The per-
ception that competence is essentially a characteristic of a relationship
rather than an individual is accurate, but inadequate, because it does
not in itself contain any conclusions about the nature of that relation-
ship. Furthermore, these conversations and communications are not
between equals.
Even the suggestion of incompetence operates to profoundly dis-
empower the person so labelled. The very process that questions an
individual's competence is disempowering and degrading to that per-
son.98 This is true for all persons, although it is only acknowledged
when powerful people or celebrities are the subjects or proposed sub-
jects of competency proceedings. 99 The simple filing of a petition can
lead to humiliation and embarrassment. to
95. Holstein, supra note 80, at 461-462.
96. DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra note 77, at 162.
97. Id.
98. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON AGING, ABUSES IN GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ELDERLY AND INFIRM: A
NATIONAL DISGRACE, H.R. Doc. No. 639, 100th Cong., 1st Session (1987); In re Estate of
Schriver, 441 So. 2d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (noting that a durable power of attorney
may help to alleviate the embarrassment relating to an incompetency proceeding).
99. One such recent case is Gary Coleman, former star of the television program Diff'rent
Strokes. His parents claim that he was mentally incompetent resulted in a lengthy article in
the Los Angeles Times Magazine. Bella Stumbo, A Tale of a Falling Star, L.A. TIMES MAG.,
May 20, 1990, at 12. Part of the subtitle of that story calls the situation a "pathetic fight
against his own parents." Id. The article then proceeds to chronicle the intimate details of
Coleman's life and more particularly his problems. Id.
100. This is illustrated by the case of Jan Stephenson, a professional golfer. Stephenson
sought an annulment of a recent marriage. Her husband tried to have her declared
incompetent and committed to a psychiatric hospital. In order to be served the petition, she
was removed from a golf course in the middle of a tournament. After undergoing a voluntary
psychiatric examination, the suit was dismissed and she returned to the tournament. This
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At each level of inquiry, the powerful person controls the nature
of the dialogue. As Catharine MacKinnon said in commenting about
Carol Gilligan's suggestion that women have a different voice, "their
difference lies in being on the bottom."10 1 It is different because it has
been declared different by those with the power to characterize differ-
ence. "It is this hierarchy that defines what difference matters, not
the other way around." 10 2 The same can be said of the voice of the
allegedly incompetent person. The powerful voice, the voice at the
top of a hierarchy, always defines the differences between competence
and incompetence.
Although competence is a matter of a dynamic or dialogue
between doctor and patient or attorney and client, legal doctrine sets
up this dialogue so that the powerful half of the conversation remains
entirely invisible. In most of these situations, the attorney or doctor
raising the question of competence describes only the client's or
patient's inability to communicate. Although the doctor or attorney
describes the failure of communication between himself and the client
or patient, he writes himself out of the story. Thus, his perspective is
transformed into an authoritative account of the client's incapacity.
Again, as MacKinnon observed: "Having power means, among other
things, that when someone says, 'This is how it is,' it is taken as being
that way.' 10 3
In fact, as one study persuasively argues:
Evidence regarding mental and interactional competence is "talked
into being" ..... Segments of a mental patient's talk during com-
mitment proceedings are typically cited as evidence probative of
arguments for commitment or release. While the production of
this talk is attributed to that person alone, close examination of the
interaction between hearing participants suggests that the testi-
mony in question results from conversational collaboration
between the patient and other courtroom participants. Thus, what
are typically taken to be signs of individual deviance or normalcy
are interactionally achieved." 4
experience devastated Stephenson, who went from being the fifth ranked money earner in the
Ladies Professional Golfers' Association to earning just $27,000 in the first six months of the
next year. David Moore & Gioia Diliberto, Nancy Isn't Alone: Jan Is Also Losing In Match
Play, PEOPLE, June 14, 1982, at 91. Stephenson's experience is common to many whose
capacity is questioned, but who rarely are given a chance to tell their stories. For a
compilation of many of these stories see SUBCOMMiTIEE ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM
CARE, supra note 98.
101. MacKinnon, supra note 16, at 1294.
102. Id.
103. Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1985).
104. Holstein, supra note 80, at 459.
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For example, district attorneys conducting cross-examinations of
patients they wanted to institutionalize ask open-ended questions,
then remain silent after the patient answered, leaving the patient
struggling to fill conversational gaps. Often courts view this process
as showing the patient's lack of competence.
Competence assessments are not a matter of communication
between equals or even between two individuals, but rather are com-
munication between an individual and a professional representing a
system that has power over that individual. The individual who raises
capacity as an issue is always the more powerful one in the relation-
ship 1°5 and often acts in the capacity of a role-created institutional
identity like physician or attorney. In these cases, competence is mea-
sured by the individual's ability to assist her attorney, or to convince
her doctor that her health care decision is reasonable. Ultimately, a
competence inquiry is often a complaint by a powerful authority fig-
ure that a less powerful individual is not adhering to the authority
figure's particular value system. For example, a leading textbook in
health law notes casually that "[t]ypically, competence is questioned
only when a patient refuses to consent to a recommended treatment
or chooses a course different from the one the doctor finds most
reasonable."106
Often, competence is raised as an issue when a less powerful per-
son questions a more powerful person's version of reality. In
fact,"[g]ood evidence supports the contention that denial [of mental
illness] is the most common basis for finding a person incompetent to
decide about [psychiatric] hospitalization." ' Physicians and other
health professionals may interpret a patient's decision to forego treat-
ment as evidence of incompetency.108 Generally, the same physician
who questions the patient's competency is the one who makes at least
the threshold determination of the patient's decisional capacity. 109 In
many, if not most, circumstances this means the physician whose
treatment recommendation is being rejected is the one making the ini-
tial competency determination. Some authors suggest that psychia-
trists evaluating patients with the possibility of impaired competence
105. Many books and articles describe the doctor-patient relationship and underscore the
great imbalance of power in that relationship. See, e.g., ELLIOT G. MISHLER, SOCIAL
CONTEXTS OF HEALTH, ILLNESS AND PATIENT CARE 97-136 (1981); CANDACE WEST,
ROUTINE COMPLICATIONS (1984); Sue V. Rosser, Is There Androcentric Bias in Psychiatric
Diagnosis?, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 215, 217 (1992); Stefan, supra at note 87, at 655-61.
106. GEORGE ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 652 (1990).
107. See Parry & Beck, supra note 54, at 105.
108. ROZOVSKY, supra note 72, at 23; Nancy K. Rhoden, The Presumption for Treatment:
Has it Been Justified?, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 65 (1985).
109. LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE ELDERLY, supra note 75, at 106.
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should carefully note the patient's view of illness and medications
because these views may be indicative of the patient's competence.110
This suggestion clearly implies that a view differing from the physi-
cian's is at least one indicator of incompetence.
At least one author notes that the same tendency can occur in
the legal setting. Attorneys may begin to doubt the competence of
elderly clients who do not wish to avail themselves of all legal rights
and remedies available to them.' 1 ' Thus, just as physicians question
the competence of people who do not want to be treated, cured, or
healed, lawyers question the competence of people who do not wish to
assert their rights or seek available legal remedies. Those decisions
clash with the doctors' or attorneys' professional values. Health care
professionals and attorneys also question a person's competence when
her behavior does not conform to gender norms. Thus, in one study
of commitment proceedings " 'gender inappropriate behavior' was lit-
erally cited as grounds for categorizing a variety of behaviors and
demeanors as 'symptoms' [of mental illness]. '"" 2
To the extent that the person who raises the issue, the expert
examiner, and the judge share the same values, the disagreement in
values or defect in communication that initiated the competence
inquiry is assumed to describe an immutable characteristic of the
powerless person. For example, a woman was subject to a commit-
ment hearing because she preferred to live in a large cardboard carton
beneath a railroad pass rather than in subsidized public housing. The
county attorney argued that
110. Gutheil & Bursztajn, supra note 74, at 1022. The issue of competency is not even
raised unless a health care professional disagrees with a patient. The patient is then presented
as "incompetent" because she disagrees with her "all-knowing" doctors. See Gladys Kessler,
Remarks on the Judge's Role and Moral Certainty, 19 LAW, MED. AND HEALTH CARE, 34
(1991). Furthermore, the patient is likely to be adjudged incompetent by physicians whenever
he refuses life sustaining treatment. See Kevin R. Wolff, Note, Determining Patient
Competency in Treatment Refusal Cases, 24 GA. L. REV. 733, 745 (1990)
111. Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question of
Competence, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 61, 91 (1988). For an excellent description of such a scenario
see S. Van McCrary & A. Terry Walman, Procedural Paternalism in Competency
Determination, 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 108 (1990). This is also the case of convicted
criminals who do not want to appeal-especially if sentenced to death. See G. Richard Strafer,
Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party
Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 904-05 (1983) (noting that allowing a
condemned inmate to waive appeal, especially after starting one, creates an ethical obligation
for a lawyer to intervene); Welsh S. White, Defendants who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L.
REV. 853, 858 (1987) (observing that defense attorneys who pressure capital defendants to
appeal believe they are usually not capable of making rational decisions about their desire to be
executed).
112. James A. Holstein, Producing Gender Effects on Involuntary Mental Hospitalization, 34
Soc. PROBS. 141, 146 (1987).
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You can't allow a woman to be exposed to all the other things that
go on out there under the tracks. Many of those men have lived
like that for years, but we're talking about a woman here. A sick
and confused woman who doesn't realize the trouble she's asking
for.' 13
If the county attorney, the mental health expert, and the judge all
share the same assumptions and values, then the woman's desire to
live under the railroad pass simply becomes symptomatic of her lack
of insight, her sickness and confusion. If one powerful person is per-
suaded that the railroad pass may in fact be safer or preferable to a
shelter or public housing," 4 her preference becomes debatable, no
longer a symptom of her incompetence. Competence in some ways is
a measure of the individual's ability to respond to an authority struc-
ture in its own language.
An examination of actual competence tests1 5 and transcripts of
competency hearings underscores these observations. For example, a
competence test developed by Lipsitt in 1971 to evaluate the compe-
tence of defendants to stand trial, 1 6 the Competency Screening Test
or CST, involves sentence completion such as:
"Jack felt that the judge -. ,,117
Defendants were asked to fill in the blanks, and were given a
score of 2 (competent) 1 (questionable) or 0 (incompetent)."'
Responses like "the judge was right" or "the judge was fair" received
two points, while responses such as "was unjust" "was too harsh" or
"was wrong" were given a score of zero. 1 9 Another example of the
sentence completion test given to the defendant is:
"When Bob disagreed with his lawyer on his defense he ." 120
113. Id. at 146.
114. In Chicago, a group of homeless people living in wooden huts under a highway
overpass refused to move to public housing because they claimed that the huts were safer. Don
Terry, Homeless Prefer Huts to Chicago's Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1992, at A7.
115. Most standardized competence tests were developed for evaluating a defendant's
capacity to stand trial. Competence assessments in other common situations tend to be more
individualized. Often, they are based simply on an interview, (competence to contract or to
make health care decisions) or conducted in retrospect (testamentary capacity). Even when
testamentary capacity is raised as an issue during the life of the testator, experts follow
generalized guidelines to assess capacity instead of using standardized instruments as in the
case of a criminal defendant. See James E. Spar & Andrew S. Garb, Assessing Competency to
Make a Will, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 169, 169 (1992).
116. Paul D. Lipsitt et al., Competency for Trial: A Screening Instrument, 128 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 105 (1971).
117. Id. at 106, Table 1, Question 3.
118. Id.
119. RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 60
(1980).
120. Lipsett, supra note 116, at 106.
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A score of zero was given to the response "he figured there was
no sense in arguing." '121
The CST is used less frequently in the wake of criticism by schol-
ars such as Roesch and Golding.' 22 But even more sensitive tests,
such as the CAI (Competency Assessment Instrument) and the IFI
(Interdisciplinary Fitness Instrument) frame assessments in terms of
"the defendant's ability to relate to the attorney," and "the defend-
ant's quality of relating to the attorney."1 23 It is clear upon whom the
burden of communication remains.
A recently published test, the Hopkins Competency Assessment
Test, was developed especially to evaluate the competency of patients
to give informed consent or write advance directives. 124 The test
takes the form of an essay written at three reading comprehension
levels.' 25 The patient reads the essay, which is about informed con-
sent and advance directives, and then answers six questions about the
essay. For example, two of the questions and their correct responses
are:
Question: What can sometimes happen to the thinking of
a patient who has been sick for a long time?
Correct Answer: After a while, the patient's thinking may not be
as good as it is now.
Question: Finish the sentence: A patient whose thinking
gets bad may not be able to
Correct Answer: Tell the doctor what the patient wants done. 1
26
The test itself is problematic. It purports to be a test of a
patient's competence to give informed consent or write advance direc-
tives, and yet simply tests a patient's ability to remember information
recently presented about advance directives, rather than examining a
patient's ability to understand treatment issues and make decisions
regarding his or her own treatment. In addition, while more than a
third of the patients were determined by the test to be incompetent to
give informed consent, "informed consent ... from all participants"
to participate in the study that validated the test was obtained. I27
121. Ronald Roesch & Stephen L. Golding, Defining and Assessing Competence to Stand
Trial, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 285, 378 (Irving B. Weiner & Allen B. Hess
eds., 1987).
122. Id. at 385.
123. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 119, at 64; see also Stephen L. Golding & Ronald
Roesch, Competency for Adjudication: An International Analysis, in LAW AND MENTAL
HEALTH: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 73, 105 (D. Weisstub ed., 1988).
124. Janofsky et al., supra note 75, at 132.
125. Id. at 133. The levels are grades 13, 8, and 6.
126. Id. at 134.
127. Id. at 132.
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In some ways, the third dynamic facing a person whose compe-
tence is questioned, that of communicating with a judge, is the
worst. '2 The following exchange from a competence hearing129
clearly reflects the hierarchical nature of capacity determinations
involving a fifty-seven year old woman artist, some of whose work
depicted scenes of violence. Because the woman had trouble paying
her rent, she was assigned a case worker from a social service agency,
who visited her, saw the pictures and was concerned. The social
worker called in a psychiatrist. The combination of $4,000.00 in over-
due rent and the disturbing art resulted in a competency hearing. The
following exchange between the woman proposed for guardianship
and the judge, who is not a terrible or atypical judge, 30 gives a flavor
of both competency as a relational concept and the competency rela-
tion as a hierarchical one. I will quote from the transcript at some
length in order to adequately convey this:
Court: Mrs. Rose, come nearer to me, so you can hear me
and I can hear you.
Mrs. Rose: Thank you.
Court: Mrs. Rose, we've now taken a number of hours-
Mrs. Rose: I'm sorry.
Court: A number of hours, which is a very small period of
time in your life, and this is an important occasion
for you as an individual.
Mrs. Rose: Yes.
The Court: Under the law, the Court has the power to institu-
tionalize you.
Mrs. Rose: Uh-huh.
Court: You know that?
Mrs. Rose: I realize that, yes.
Court: I also have the power to incarcerate you. When I use
the word 'institutionalize,' we have facilities, mental
facilities and other facilities to keep you for a period
of time and put you under psychiatric treatment in
the hospitals.
Mrs. Rose: Uh huh.
Court: Is that what you want to do?
Mrs. Rose: I don't think that's appropriate or would be helpful
to my sense of self or capacity to do anything-
Court: No big speeches.
128. Michael L. Perlin, Pretext and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993).
129. In re Rose, No. 54554/88, unpublished hearing transcript (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 20,
1988) (on file with author).
130. See generally Perlin, supra note 128.
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Mrs. Rose: I think it would be very damaging, though I know
these things do happen in the world, and I'm ready
for anything.
Court: Based upon your testimony and based upon all the
earmarks of this case, that's what should be done, but
I'm not going to do that.
Mrs. Rose: Thank you.
Court: ... What I'm going to do is order a conservator to be
appointed for you.
The conservator will require your cooperation.
Mrs. Rose: Yes.
Court: And there's a limited amount that any conservator
can do for your welfare without your being amenable
and helpful.
Mrs. Rose: I will try to the best of my ability. I try hard. And I
don't expect much either. But I'm very grateful for
what comes.
Court: ... Let's see how it works out. And as I said before,
I cannot overemphasize that this requires your coop-
eration. I'm not taking your freedom away. I'm per-
mitting you to be part of society.
But what I want you to do is be part of a-con-
tribute something to society by taking care of your-
self and by cooperating. When I use the words
taking care of yourself, I mean the way society
expects somebody to take care of themself [sic]. You
may not agree with all facets of society. That's irrele-
vant.
There was a great economist called Jeremiah
Benson [sic] in England in 1700-something. His real
test is the greatest amount of good to the greatest
amount of people.
When we live in this complex society, we have
to conform to a great degree with what's happening
in our society, and you cannot become violent.
Mrs. Rose: ... [T]here's a difference between something pictorial
and violence.
Court: Please. I do the talking, you do the listening.
Mrs. Rose: Okay. '
131. In re Rose, No. 43554/88, unpublished hearing transcript at 57-62. Published
decisions rarely contain extended quotations from the transcript of proceedings, but those that
do can be illuminating. For an example of the short shrift which a judge gives a woman's lack
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Competence is, therefore, relational and contextual and describes
communication. It is not a fixed, inherent characteristic of an individ-
ual. 132 The relationships and communications that provide the con-
text in which competence is questioned and assessed are powerfully
unequal and hierarchical. The law, however, is not structured to take
account of these differentials in power.
In this Part, I have discussed how the law ignores these differen-
tials in the process of questioning and assessing competence. In the
next section, I examine how the law compartmentalizes legal recogni-
tion of people's powerlessness into two very separate doctrinal areas,
competence on the one hand and duress, coercion and necessity on
the other. I also examine how this separation serves to efface the
allegedly incompetent person's lack of agency,1 13 rendering it ineffec-
of comprehension of the stipulation regarding marital assets, see Howard v. Howard, 352
N.W.2d 280, 283 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
132. RICHARD RESTAK, THE BRAIN HAS A MIND OF ITS OWN 154 (1991). Another
moving example of the relationship between value judgments about the nature of
communication and assessments of competence is recounted by Oliver Sacks. OLIVER SACKS,
The Twins, in THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL TALES
195, reprinted in OLIVER SACKS (1990). This true account, which I have read many times and
have yet to read without crying, is about twins "variously diagnosed as autistic, psychotic or
severely retarded." Id. at 195. They communicate with each other with "serene and
meditative and almost holy intensity," by exchanging prime numbers which they seem to
intuitively know without benefit of books or tables. Id. at 202. When Sacks wishes to
communicate with them, he brings a book of prime numbers:
I quietly joined them. They were taken aback at first, but when I made no
interruption, they resumed their "game" of six-figure primes. After a few
minutes I decided to join in, and ventured a number, an eight-figure prime. They
both turned towards me, then suddenly became still, with a look of intense
concentration and perhaps wonder on their faces. There was a long pause...
and then suddenly, simultaneously, they both broke into smiles .... They drew
apart slightly, making room for me ....
Id. at 203.
Because the twins cannot communicate with people in power, they are:
[S]eparated-'for their own good,' to prevent their 'unhealthy communication
together .... ' Deprived of their numerical 'communion' with each other, and of
time and opportunity for any 'contemplation' or 'communion' at all ... they
seem to have lost their strange numerical power, and with this the chief joy and
sense of their lives.
Id. at 209-10.
The twins now live in halfway houses and work at menial jobs. Id. at 209. Are they now more
competent than when they were institutionalized? Who is to measure this? Who is to say?
I had a vivid example of this many years ago which I have been unable to forget. I was
reading a psychiatry text that gave as an example of meaningless associations a woman
patient's stream of words. Although meaningless to the psychiatrist, they were in fact an exact
quotation of an obscure poem by Conrad Aiken that I happened to recognize. I often wonder
what the meaning of the poem was for the woman, its association with her circumstances, and
what became of her.
133. Although many feminists and scholars use the term "agency," few define it. In
Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990), women's agency
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tual in terms of legal doctrine.
IV. COMPETENCE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF FALSE AUTONOMY
Competence doctrine has its greatest impact in the way it con-
structs the world of competent people, especially competent women,
and its separation of their lives from those of incompetent women.
Competence doctrine is a strong statement that all people are equally
powerful in their own lives, regardless of gender; and that constraints
on one's agency are self-generated and not socially caused at all. This
is because competence doctrine is based on an unquestioned assump-
tion that all individuals inherently possess equal agency and, barring
aberrant internal disabilities or specific external duress, are equally
free to exercise it. Competence doctrine holds that people who cannot
make and effectuate decisions in their lives because of mental retarda-
tion, age, alcoholism, or mental or physical illness, 134 are powerless
because of the conditions themselves, and not because the social con-
struction of any of these conditions has rendered them powerless.
Feminist scholars have difficulty articulating the actual constraints on
women's agency and self-determination in terms of legal doctrine.
This is partly because of the world constructed by competence
doctrine.
Within the concept of competence are embedded a series of
assumptions about the world that do not reflect the experience of
women or powerless groups generally. The world constructed by
competence doctrine is one in which the norm is a rational, autono-
mous, volitional individual who makes choices by receiving informa-
tion and weighing the pros and cons of a given decision in a rational
way. It is a world in which law presumes that all people are empow-
ered to act as their own agents and to effectuate their own decisions.
"The well-entrenched view that individuals are free, self-determining,
and independent of social structures, systems, and groups is con-
nected to the basic Western conception of individual responsibility for
the consequences of choice."'135 As one court stated, "[C]ompetency
appears to be equated with control over their lives. Id. at 780. Martha Mahoney contrasts the
traditional approach to agency, which describes a wholly mobile autonomous individual who
can leave and choose what she is going to do at any time with a more complex approach to
agency as women's struggle to construct their lives in the midst of ongoing violence and
oppression. Martha Mahoney, Oppression or Victimization? Women's Lives, Violence and
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (Martha Fineman & Roxanne
Tykitiuk eds.) (forthcoming 1994, manuscript on file with author). See also Martha Mahoney,
Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1283, 1310, 1314 (1992).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
135. Minow, supra note 82, at 55 n.217.
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... turns on the patient's ability to function as a decision-maker, act-
ing in accordance with her preferences and values."'' 3 6 Two assump-
tions are implicit here: first, if a person can make decisions, it follows
that she can act upon those decisions, and her actions will accord with
her preferences and values. Second, if she cannot function as a deci-
sionmaker in accordance with her preferences and values, it must be
caused by her own incapacity or lack of volitional ability. 37 By sepa-
rating out some people as unable to make choices, and having special
rules about them, the law reaffirms the power and agency of the rest
of us, underscores our choices as our own, and distracts us from our
commonality with women who have been found incompetent.
In the world of the law, there are only two doctrinal explanations
for the inability to exercise choice and autonomy, that is, for a
woman's lack of agency in her own life: incompetence or lack of
capacity, where the problem springs from within the person; and
coercion or duress, where the problem springs from the unlawful acts
of a specifically identifiable other. Anything else, anything systemic,
falls into the category which the law labels as "force of
circumstances." 38
I agree at least that there is force involved in many of these cir-
cumstances. Yet women's ability to function as decisionmakers, and
the impairment of those abilities, do not actually look like the legal
doctrines that purport to reflect these issues. The law ignores the
effect of continual and powerful domination and subordination on
who we are and on our decisionmaking capacity. For example, cir-
cumstances such as long-term violence and abuse may obliterate a
woman's recognition of herself as a decisionmaker at all; this violence
and abuse is labelled as learned helplessness or battered woman syn-
drome. 13  If this is seen as her pathology, the law may offer her some
136. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990).
137. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 9 (1987). Otherwise volitional acts become
involuntary when the actor's will is impaired by insanity, retardation, or uncontrollable urges.
So too are acts resulting from external pressure such as torture or intimidation. Additionally,
some acts may be purely of one's own volition but if all of the alternatives available to choose
from are unacceptable, this volition is constrained. Id.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 190-255; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 174-175 and introductory notes at 473 (1981); 25 AM. JUR. 2D, Duress and
Undue Influence § 3 (1966); 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1608, at
682 (3rd ed. 1970). For a particularly comprehensive explanation of the doctrines of duress,
coercion and undue influence, see Lempert v. Singer, 766 F. Supp. 1356 (D.V.I. 1991).
139. See Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321, 330 (1992) (explaining that the theory of learned
helplessness demonstrates that because a battered woman has learned not to trust her natural
responses, she cannot predict that what she does will impact upon her safety).
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redress. But, as both Lenore Walker 1" and Martha Mahoney141 have
pointed out, the battered woman's perceptions of the constraints on
her decisionmaking may not be pathological at all but grounded in
reality. Paradoxically, this eliminates the change of legal remedy by
transforming the inquiry from her mental incapacity to her circum-
stantial constraints. Because these constraints are not cognizable as
either her incompetence or (except under very extreme conditions)
duress, the law presumes that she is a competent individual whose
actions and decisions are a result of her own free will. Battered
women are perceived by law to be either pathological victims who are
out of contact with reality, and therefore entitled to some remedy, or
autonomous individuals capable of making choices in their lives (pre-
sumably, the choice to leave) and therefore responsible for those
choices. There is, as Martha Mahoney explains, no room for com-
plexity or struggle in this legal vision.142
Both competence and coercion doctrine analyze people's situa-
tions-their capacity or the coercion exerted on them-in typically
narrow time frames and in very individualized and localized ways.
Because incapacity and duress or coercion are separate legal doc-
trines, they can be played off against each other. Because they focus
on the individual woman and her situation, the law excludes any con-
sideration of systemic powerlessness and denial of autonomy.
Although these doctrines dictate the questions we ask about the
power to make choices, they are the wrong questions.
Occasionally, legal scholars and policymakers attempt to bridge
the conceptual gap between competency doctrine and duress doctrine,
and to grapple with systemic issues of lack of agency and autonomy.
This has happened only when the systems involved are circumscribed,
limited and well-defined. For example, in the 1970s, ethicists and
legal scholars frequently debated whether prisoners and institutional-
ized individuals could ever autonomously consent to experimental
procedures. 143 In these cases, the populations are not inherently
incompetent in the traditional sense, so competence doctrine does not
140. Id. at 333. Walker notes that leaving an abusive relationship will not stop the violence,
thus limiting a battered woman's options of how to respond.
141. See Mahoney, supra note 133, at 1288, 1304; Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 64-71 (1991)
[hereinafter Mahoney, Issue of Separation].
142. Mahoney, supra note 133, at 1308-10.
143. For example, in one case a patient was committed for an indefinite period to a state
hospital under a criminal sexual psychopath statute. The patient signed an informed consent
form agreeing to psychosurgery. The court determined that "involuntarily detained patients
cannot give informed and adequate consent to experimental psychosurgery," due to "the
inherent inequality of their position" vis-a-vis doctors and institutional administration.
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explain the sense that the decisions were not made freely.'" Tradi-
tional doctrines of duress were difficult to apply since the decisions of
prisoners and patients to participate in experiments were not the
result of any threats. In other words, the prisoners' and patients'
choices appear to be competent and voluntary, within the context of
the systems that incarcerate and institutionalize them. And yet
courts, 45 scholars, 146 and policymakers 147 were uneasy with the
assumption that the decisions were autonomous:
It seems at first glance that the principle of respect for persons
requires that prisoners not be deprived of the opportunity to volun-
teer for research ... [but] when persons seem regularly to engage
in activities which, were they stronger or in better circumstances,
they would avoid, respect dictates that they be protected against
those forces that appear to compel their choices ....4
The assumption of autonomy and agency with which the law endows
all individuals is so strong, however, and the consequences of recog-
nizing as a matter of law that systemic circumstances could impinge
on individual autonomy are so dire, that ultimately a strong consen-
sus emerged that prisoners and institutionalized persons could act
with autonomy within their environments. 149 Arguments by feminist
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73.19434-AW, 2 Prison L. Rep. 433 (1973)
(Mich. Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973).
144. The court in Kaimowitz based its concern about the patient's competence to consent to
experimental psychosurgery on the "fact [that] institutional confinement has special force in
undermining the capacity of the mental patient to make a competent decision on this issue
even though he be intellectually competent to (make the decision]." Id. at 476.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., J. Arboleda-Florez, Ethical Issues Regarding Research on Prisoners, 35 INT'L
J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1991) (noting that prisoners are
exposed to overt and covert pressures to participate in research). Because a prison is a coercive
setting, a prisoner's informed consent does not necessarily imply that the decision was
voluntary. See ROZOVSKY, supra note 72, at 21; see also George Bach-y-Rita, The Prisoner As
an Experimental Subject, 229 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 45 (1974) (observing that several types of
coercive pressure occur in prisons); Bernard Barber, The Ethics of Experimentation with
Human Subjects, 234 Sci. AM. 25, 31 (1976) (noting that prisoners' consent may be logically
impossible due to their implicitly coercive situation). Moreover, "[i]n the prison population,
communications of researchers regarding informed consent becomes less important than the
fact that the prisoners are inherently unfree and without alternatives." BERNARD BARBER,
INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL THERAPY AND RESEARCH 165 (1980). But see Carl
Cohen, Medical Experimentation on Prisoners, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROFESSIONAL LIFE 193
(Joan C. Callahan, ed., 1988) (noting that while prisons are coercive this does not necessarily
mean that a prisoner cannot give full consent).
147. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON PRISONERS, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. No. OS76-132, 3-6 (1976).
148. Id. at 6.
149. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 146, at 197, 200 (observing that it has not been shown that
a prisoner cannot give full consent); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA
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theorists that women in this society share much in common with pris-
oners150 and institutionalized persons151 have not addressed this par-
ticular similarity: that individual actions in an environment whose
purpose and process operates to constrain autonomy are legally
assumed to be acts of agency.
In sum, the division between competence doctrine and coercion
doctrine does two specific things. First, it creates a legal and concep-
tual abyss between women in what might otherwise be understood as
similar situations. Second, it splits what are otherwise powerful sto-
ries of women's lives into artificial distinctions. Each part of the now
disjoined story is then subject to separate legal analysis, ultimately
resulting in a failure to provide a remedy for obvious injury. 152 Most
of the cases in which this occurs are not readily susceptible to equality
Treatment of the Sexual Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 21-22 (1990) (suggesting that
prisoners who participate in medical experiments do not feel coerced); Nancy M. P. King &
Gail Henderson, Treatments of Last Resort: Informed Consent and the Diffusion of New
Technology, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1007 (1991) (noting that situational coercion may impair
freedom without necessarily impairing autonomy); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Total Institutions and
the Possibility of Consent to Organic Therapies, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY:
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 183 (1979) (theorizing that inmates can give informed, -
voluntary, and competent consent to such procedures as psychosurgery); Barbara H. Stanley &
Michael Stanley, Psychiatric Patients in Research: Protecting their Autonomy, 22
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 420, 421 (1981) (noting that mentally ill patients can consent
to research and not allowing them to do so results in a loss of autonomy). This argument is
reemerging with the recent trend of courts offering individuals convicted of sex offenses or
child abuse the option of castration, sterilization, or implantation with contraceptive devices.
See Douglas J. Besharov, Sex Offenders, Is Castration an Acceptable Punishment?: Yes:
Consider Chemical Treatment, A.B A. J., July 1992, at 42; Linda S. Demsky, The Use of
Depro-Provera in the Treatment of Sex Offenders, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 295, 321 (1984)
(concluding that treatment of sex offenders with Depro-Provera offers a promising solution to
the high recidivism rate of sex offenders); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA
Treatment of the Sexual Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 57 (1990) ("MPA treatment should
be considered as acceptable innovative therapy for the treatment of convicted paraphiliacs.");
Andrew Vachhs, Sex Offenders, Is Castration an Acceptable Punishment?: No: Pragmatically
Impotent, A.B.A. J., July 1992 at 43; Sandra G. Boodman, Does Castration Stop Sex Crimes?
An Old Punishment Gains New Attention, but Experts Doubt its Value, WASH. POST, March 17,
1992, at Z7 (reviewing the rekindled public debate caused by a Texas man's request that the
state castrate, rather than imprison him, for rape); Tamar Lewin, Implanted Birth Control
Device Renews Debate on Forced Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20 (focusing
on renewed debate over forced contraception after a court ordered a woman convicted of child
abuse to have Norplant implanted as a condition of probation); Robert Matas, Castration
Mulled for Serious Sex Offenders, ARIZ. Bus. GAZETrE, Jan. 19, 1990, at L6 (reporting
Washington state legislature's debate of proposals calling for surgical castration of serious sex
offenders).
150. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
151. Susan Stefan, The Cloak of Benevolence (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
152. The observation that the law is constructed in ways that place women's suffering
outside the scope of legal redress is not new. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 105, at 82.
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analysis, precisely because they apply only to women.1 53 These cases
include competence to consent to sexual intercourse, to decide to bear
children, and to give children up for adoption.
A. Competence to Consent to Sexual Intercourse
Rape law in all fifty states and the District of Columbia punishes
sexual intercourse with a woman who lacks capacity or is incompe-
tent to consent. 15 4 This is somewhat similar to the concept of statu-
tory rape, although it is significantly different in that statutory rape
imposes bright-line boundaries of age, whereas the laws regarding
incompetence give courts wide latitude to interpret the meaning of
capacity to consent to sexual intercourse. Thus, for example, one
statute defines rape as an act of sexual intercourse with a female
"[w]here she is incapable, through lunacy or any other unsoundness
of mind whether temporary or permanent of giving legal consent." 155
When I began to research this material, my hunch was that
courts would use these statutes to criminalize consensual sexual inter-
course involving mentally handicapped women because of deep-seated
social hostility to the idea of handicapped women as sexual beings and
153. Catharine MacKinnon, among others, notes that one of the central flaws of formal
equality analysis is that it requires a referent or comparison. If the challenged action does not
happen to men differently, any injustice or oppression in how it happens to women is not
cognizable under equality analysis. CATHERINE MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance:
On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32
(1987). MacKinnon notes that:
These experiences have been silenced out of the difference definition of sex
equality largely because they happen almost exclusively to women. Understand:
for this reason, they are considered not to raise sex equality issues. Because this
treatment is done almost uniquely to women, it is implicitly treated as a
difference, the sex difference, when in fact it is the socially situated subjection of
women.
Id. at 41.
154. See K.H. Larsen, Annotation, Rape or Similar Offense Based on Intercourse With a
Woman Who Is Allegedly Mentally Deficient, 31 A.L.R. 3d 1227 (1970 and Supp. 1992).
155. IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (Supp. 1992). Another statute states that "[flack of consent
results from . . . [i]ncapacity to consent." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2)-(3) (McKinney
1988). The statute goes on to define a person as "deemed incapable of consent when he is: (a)
less than seventeen years old; or (b) mentally defective; or (c) mentally incapacitated; or (d)
physically helpless." Id. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10 (allowing as an affirmative
defense lack of knowledge of facts and conditions responsible for incapacity to consent). But
see State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 1980) (stating that the crime does not require
knowledge or consent). Constitutional challenges to these statutes almost always fail. See,
e.g., State v. Degrenier, 424 A.2d 412, 413 (N.H. 1980). But see Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d at 270,
272 (Iowa 1980) (striking down as constitutionally vague that portion of the statute making it
a crime to participate in a sex act with a person who "lacks the mental capacity to know the
right and wrong of conduct in sexual matters").
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as mothers. 15 6 Although there are one or two cases that seemed to fit
into this category, 57 the vast majority did not tell this story at all.158
Instead, the defendant in a typical case described his relations
with the woman alleged to be incompetent as follows:
If you were to look at [her] and tell her to get undressed, get into
bed, she would do it if you told her to do it, if you asked her to do
it, she'd tell you no or she'd say do I have to, but if you looked at
her and gave her an order do it, she would do it.' 59
A woman in another typical case told the man that:
[S]he did not want to have sex with him, but they had sex anyway.
About an hour later, [he] wanted to have sex again, and they did,
on the living room floor. [The woman] again said she did not want
to have sex. [She] said [he] did not threaten her or promise her
anything.' 60
In both these cases, the jury found the women incompetent to
understand the nature of sexual intercourse and convicted the men of
rape. 161
These cases are not about criminalization of consensual sexual
behavior with handicapped women who consented to intercourse, but
rather about criminalization of nonconsensual sexual behavior with
women who have capacity to understand the nature of the act and
who object to sex. 162 The woman does not meet the statutory stan-
dard at all: she does not lack the capacity to understand the meaning
of sexual intercourse. She just does not want to have sex. However,
these are cases where standard rape law would not have sufficed to
sustain a conviction. 163 There is little or no resistance beyond the hes-
itation or reluctance that clearly conveys the woman's distaste for and
156. Susan Stefan, Whose Egg is it Anyway?: Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated,
Institutionalized and Incompetent Women, 13 NOVA L. REV. 405, 454-55 (1989).
157. The defendant is rarely convicted in these cases. See, e.g., People v. Blunt, 212 N.E.2d
719 (Ill. Ct. App. 1965); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.2d 649 (Ky. App. 1942); State v.
Green, 1990 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 653 (Oct. 3, 1990).
158. I have based this section on my examination of over sixty cases from thirty-one states,
dating between the late 1800s and 1992.
159. State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 111 (Idaho 1990) (alteration in original).
160. State v. Willenbring, 454 N.W.2d 268, 269 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
161. Soura, 796 P.2d at 115; Willenbring, 454 N.W.2d at 271.
162. In Salsman v. Commonwealth 565 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), the woman
refused defendant's request for sex, refused his request for fellatio and "resisted by covering
her mouth." Id. at 639-40. Defendant "grabbed her" and removed her clothes. Id. at 640.
She continued to protest, saying ,"No, no." Id. In State v. Kingsley, 383 N.W.2d 828 (N.D.
1986), while one victim testified she was "forced," the other testified she asked defendant to
"please get off me". Id. at 829-30. See also Wootton v. State, 799 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tx. Ct.
App. 1990) (finding that victim "resisted the alleged sexual assault").
163. Traditionally, rape law requires resistance to show non-consent or force. See Susan
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1099, 1130-31 (1986).
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desire to avoid intercourse. The woman says, "No," or "Do I have
to?" Under our law, this would never be enough to convict a man of
rape.
Courts must find these women incompetent in order to circum-
vent the discontinuity between rape law and women's experiences of
forced sex. Thus, the laws criminalizing sexual contact with incompe-
tent women essentially affirm that sex for every other woman is the
product of understanding and conscious choice. If it were not, she
would have manifested it through far more resistance than occurs in
these cases. Ironically, the only women whose "No" is taken to mean
"No" are women that the law finds incompetent to make decisions.
This conclusion is strikingly underscored by the fact that when
mentally handicapped women engage in clearly consensual sex, courts
will not uphold the conviction of the man regardless of the apparent
severity of the woman's disability. A thirty-two-year-old woman who
had been in nursing homes since the age of eight because of irrevers-
ible brain injury (and whose competence was not questioned when she
signed a consent form for sterilization), invited a regular visitor to the
nursing home to have sex with her. He was prosecuted on the
grounds that she was incompetent to consent to intercourse. 16  Evi-
dence was introduced that she had been married, and that the nursing
home regularly allowed her private time to have sex. 165 The woman
testified, and it was apparent that she had wanted to have sex. 166 Cor-
rectly noting that the sexual activity was a crime only if the victim
was "incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct,"' 167 the court
threw out the conviction. 168 The part of this case that is in marked
contrast to the cases where convictions are sustained relates to the
woman's apparent consent to and desire for the intercourse. The level
of disability, which is technically all that should matter under these
laws, is hardly mentioned at all. 16
9
What would case law look like if courts could recognize the com-
monality of women's situations in this area? One interesting case
164. State v. Green, 1990 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 653 at *4 (Oct. 3, 1990). Green was
charged with assault with intent to commit sexual battery and burglary. The burglary
conviction depended, of course, on the illegality of his underlying actions with regard to sexual
intercourse. Id. at * 11.
165. Id. at *4.
166. "No issue of consent or force was presented." Id.
167. Id. The court remarked that no psychiatric or psychological testimony was offered as
to the woman's disability. Id. at *5. On the other hand, the woman's present and previous
medical doctors testified. Id at *7-*10. This would have been more than sufficient expert
testimony in other cases.
168. Id. at *11.
169. See id. at *7.
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reflects the beginning of the answer to this question. A recent Florida
case involved a charge of sexual battery. 7 ' The State indicated that it
would contend at trial that "because of a history of an abusive rela-
tionship between the victim and the defendant, the victim was incapa-
ble of consenting to the sexual intercourse. "171 Essentially, the
brutality of the relationship made her "unable to refuse," and her fear
cause[d] her to behave in ways that appear to show 'things are nor-
mal' when in fact they are not. '1 2
This is a striking case because the court is recognizing that the
woman's outward behavior, which looked like a choice to have sex, is
not in fact an act of consent to sex at all, but a choice for survival. In
those sorts of circumstances, she is "incapable of consenting to sexual
intercourse;"' a7 3 yet the court does not have to justify her incapacity to
consent by reference to some pathology or defect within her, but finds
her incapacity in the constraints of her situation.
B. Competence to Enter Divorce and Separation Agreements
Both women and men sometimes seek to set aside divorce agree-
ments that are adverse to them on the grounds that they lacked capac-
ity at the time they consented to these arrangements. Like the right
to die cases, courts in cases contesting separation and divorce agree-
ments on grounds of capacity theoretically apply gender neutral con-
cepts of competence. In fact, the courts' approach to, and the
outcome of, cases differ depending on whether the party seeking to
rescind the agreement is a woman or a man. Women win these cases
far more frequently than men for a variety of reasons.' 74 First, courts
170. State v. Rhone, 566 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
171. Id. at 1367.
172. Id. at 1368. Ultimately, Rhone pled guilty to false imprisonment, and prosecutors
dropped the sexual battery counts. He was sentenced to probation for the false imprisonment
and time served for the battery. He later violated probation and received a four-year sentence.
Telephone Interview with Les Seidman, Assistant State Attorney, Sex Crimes and Child Abuse
Unit of the Florida State Attorney's Office, Broward County, Fla. (March 22, 1993).
173. Rhone, 566 So. 2d at 1367.
174. Men who claim that they were incompetent when they entered into economically
disadvantageous separation agreements almost uniformly lose. See, e.g., Goza v. Goza, 470
So. 2d 1262 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Johnston v. Johnston, 465 A.2d 436 (Md. Ct. App. 1983);
Van Wagoner v. Van Wagoner, 346 N.W.2d 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Ridings v.Ridings, 286
S.E.2d 614 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); DiPietro v. DiPietro, 460 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983);
Pillow v. Pillow, 410 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). One of the few cases where a man won
such a case is Blattner v. Blattner, 411 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). In that case, after a
sixteen-year marriage, the husband contracted multiple sclerosis. He was hospitalized in
January and again in March. He was transferred to a nursing home in March, where he was
placed on antidepressant drugs. His wife and her lawyer came to his room at the nursing
home with a stipulation awarding the wife the house and the car and waiving rights to spousal
maintenance. Id. at 25. Although there was some evidence that the divorce was "for purposes
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tend to entertain men's claims of mental and even physical incapacity
with skepticism, often looking behind or disregarding entirely the tes-
timony of experts that a man was "severely depressed"' 75 or suffering
from "impaired mental status." 7 6 When women make these claims,
courts accept the testimony of experts on incapacity far more readily.
When women lose these cases, the courts often cite the law as control-
ling. 17 In contrast, many courts simply do not believe a man's claim
of incapacity, and look for more plausible reasons for his agreeing to
an unequal bargain. Often these reasons are seen by courts as arising
from the fact that the husband was involved in an affair prior to the
dissolution of the marriage:
The court is satisfied that he knew exactly what he was doing and
that there should be no relief granted from a settlement that he
entered into knowingly in open court without any pressure from
anybody else other than his own knowledge that he could lose the
whole thing if some of his peccadilloes with his girl friend came
out. 178
of medicaid eligibility," apparently not all of the property the husband gave up was necessary
for this eligibility. Id. at 27. Women win more frequently in those cases where they claim they
were incompetent when they entered into economically disadvantageous separation
agreements. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Baltins, 212 Cal. App. 3d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987); Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1978); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 369 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), modified, 388 N.W.2d
713 (Minn. 1986); Galloway v. Galloway, 281 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1979). Women argue lack of
capacity far more often than men, and lose more of these cases than they win; but their success
in making these arguments is still disproportionately greater than men who are similarly
situated. In all, of thirty-one cases examined, nine involved men making claims of incapacity
and twenty-two involved women. Men lost eight of nine cases, while women lost twelve of
twenty-one cases.
175. DiPietro, 460 N.E.2d at 663-64.
176. Van Wagoner, 346 N.W.2d at 79.
177. For example, courts in Alabama have developed an interpretation of the law that
virtually ensures that no one can win a claim of incapacity. A plaintiff must show that he or
she was non compos mentis at the time of the agreement, that is, "there must be a showing of
actual insanity ... " Goza, 470 So. 2d at 1264. Women's claims of lack of capacity that
probably would have succeeded elsewhere uniformly lose in Alabama. See, e.g., McDaniel v.
McDaniel, 515 So. 2d 13 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987); Hester v. Hester, 474 So. 2d 734, 735 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1985) (finding wife competent when she signed settlement agreement even though
less than two weeks later she was hospitalized for "major depression with psychotic features");
Ritenour v. Ritenour, 448 So. 2d 956 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 302
So. 2d 233, 235 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974) (finding wife incompetent when she signed agreement
under the following circumstances: The wife's seventeen year old pregnant daughter eloped.
The wife then began to drink heavily and was institutionalized May 29th and released June
3rd. On June 6th, her husband discussed divorce with her. On June 8th she attacked him. On
June 12th she was served with complaint. On June 14 she went with husband (a doctor) to the
office of a lawyer engaged by husband "to handle the divorce for both," where she signed the
agreement). Husbands also lose in Alabama. See Bailey v. Bailey, 560 So. 2d 1076 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1990).
178. Van Wagoner, 346 N.W.2d at 79. In Van Wagoner the husband had multiple surgeries
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The record in this case argues more strongly for a conclusion
that appellant signed the separation agreement to relieve himself of
the stress caused by his extra-marital relationship, and to fulfill his
desires to be removed from an unhappy marriage and to live with and
marry another woman.179 Interestingly, while conceding that adul-
tery could cause women great stress, courts do not explore the emo-
tional effect of the extra-marital affair on the man. Courts assume
that stress, whether from physical illness or emotional pressure, does
not seriously affect a man's competency. In retrospect, courts are
more likely to assess women in similar circumstances to have lacked
capacity. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
Roseann Lindsey lacked capacity when she agreed to a property set-
tlement and support provisions. 80 Her psychiatrist testified that she
was "severely depressed and afraid of her husband, and that this fear
had affected her judgment; she would simply 'give in' to her husband
and was dependent upon him.... He also testified that Roseann had
difficulty dealing with reality and making rational decisions during
the period in question."'' Roseann testified that her husband "told
her he would take care of her and that he threatened to take her chil-
dren away if she sought legal representation."'' 8 2
The court of appeals characterized Roseann Lindsey as suffering
from a severe mental illness. Professionals diagnosed her as manic
depressive and also as suffering from periodic memory failures. 83
The Minnesota Supreme Court found that she "clearly lacked the
capacity to validly enter into a stipulated dissolution decree."'' 84
The approach courts use in these cases probably differs because
the facts of the situations presented by men and women differ dramat-
ically. Many of these cases tell stories of husbands' infidelity, 85 phys-
ical abuse and violence, 86 separation of the wife from her children,
and threats that she would never see them again unless she signed the
before trial and was in pain during trial. His surgeon and a psychiatric social worker testified
that he "was under stress and impaired mental status at the time of the trial"). Id. at 78-79.
179. See, e.g., DiPietro, 460 N.E.2d at 664. In the months prior to signing the separation
agreement, the husband had been hospitalized for severe depression, placed on medication and
had suffered a temporary loss of memory. His wife testified "that at one time she was afraid he
might take his life." Id. at 662.
180. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 388 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 1986).
181. Id. at 715.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 716.
185. Van Wagoner v. Van Wagoner, 346 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Barrie v.
Barrie, 381 A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); DiPietro, 460 N.E.2d at 663;
Pillow v. Pillow, 410 S.E.2d 407, 408 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
186. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Baltins, 212 Cal. App. 3d 66, 75 (Cal Ct. App. 1989); Casto
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agreement. 18 7 The women are more often institutionalized, for longer
periods of time, and subjected to intrusive treatments such as electric
shock.188 The men give evidence of incapacity such as crying in front
of their friends.' 89
The most striking aspect of these cases, however, is not the dis-
similarity between the experiences of men and women who claim
incapacity during separation or divorce. It is the similarity between
the experiences of women who claim that they entered into a disad-
vantageous divorce agreement solely because of lack of capacity and
the experiences of women who do not claim incapacity or duress in
entering into divorce agreements. It is difficult to distinguish between
Roseann Lindsey and many other competent women in her position-
afraid of her husband, financially dependent on him, and afraid to lose
her children. These women must live with the results of the dissolu-
tion agreements they agreed to competently but powerlessly. 90
Both these cases and the rape cases discussed in Part IV.A show
that courts will manipulate competence doctrine to reach a just result.
Unfortunately, courts will only protect women that they perceive as,
or who are willing to label themselves as, particularly powerless
because of an internal mental defect or disability. Competence doc-
trine leaves the courts blind to the similarity of experiences between
women labeled as competent and those labeled as incompetent. So-
called competent women may in fact feel equally powerless. But
because the law presumes they are autonomous free agents, they have
no legal remedy in the absence of arguing that some internal disability
incapacitated them or of presenting proof of egregious duress. Pres-
ently the doctrines of competence and duress are completely sepa-
rated. The effect of domination not rising to the level of duress or
vulnerability not falling to the level of incapacity is not cognizable by
the legal system. When women urge that their circumstances be con-
sidered as a whole, courts explicitly reject the women's arguments. In
Lundstrom v. Lundstrom,'9 ' a woman who had been hospitalized for
v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334-35 (Fla. 1987); Young v. Young, 455 N.E. 2d 1360, 1361 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1982).
187. Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757, 760 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1978).
188. See, e.g., Ritenour v. Ritenour, 448 So. 2d 956, 957 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Ford v.
Ford, 605 S.W.2d 756, 757-58 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 369 N.W.2d 26, 28
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
189. See, e.g., Goza v. Goza, 470 So. 2d 1262, 1265 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 1985).
190. "[M]others often find themselves bargaining away financial claims in exchange for
custody .... Even if the father does not want custody, his lawyer often will advise him to
claim it in order to have a bargaining chip with which to bargain down his wife's financial
claims." Williams, supra note 56, at 838.
191. 1992 WL 20734 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1992).
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taking an overdose of medication less than five weeks before the hear-
ing moved to vacate a stipulation dividing marital assets. A psycholo-
gist's affidavit was introduced stating that:
[H]e saw appellant in his office the day before the... hearing [at
which the stipulation was negotiated and signed] and that she was
very confused and had told him that she did not feel prepared for
the divorce proceedings the next day. The psychologist opined
that appellant was unable to understand and participate meaning-
fully in the stipulation and default proceedings because of her
severe depression, passivity disorder, and adjustments to new
medication. 192
The court methodically disjoined the issues of fraud (relating to
incompetence) and duress, and applied the tests for each separately.
Because the test of "whether a person can fairly and reasonably
understand the matter he [sic] is considering," was met, there was no
fraud perpetrated upon the court. 193 Duress, of course, requires
"threat or compulsion."' 94 The court noted that the appellant did not
"separate the issues of fraud and duress. Instead, appellant seems to
say that a combination of all her circumstances shows that she could
not object to the agreement."' 195
The argument that a court should look at a "combination of all
her circumstances" is not unprecedented in other areas. Many legal
questions turn on the "totality of the circumstances test."' 196 To
require a woman under these circumstances to show that a man used
actual force or threats, as courts have interpreted duress doctrine,
fails to appreciate that "power can be exercised without violence."' 97
Domestic situations in which there is the most duress may be those in
which the least overt force is manifested, 98 and when the woman is
192. Id. at *1.
193. Id. at *3. The claimed fraud upon the court in this case was appellant's incompetency
at the time of the hearing.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. For example, the totality of the circumstances test is used to determine whether
probable cause exists to support a search warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The
test is also used to determine whether a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a jury
instruction that he is presumed innocent, Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 ((1979)
(per curiam), and whether federal law preempts state law in a given area. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747-48 (1985).
197. Estrich, supra note 163, at 1105.
198. JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND ABUSE 76-95 (1992). In the wake of violence,
women may try to modify their behavior to avoid further violence. To an observer, the past
violence appears invisible, and the woman appears to be acting of her own free will, when in
fact she is responding to violence in order to survive. Martha Mahoney, Issue of Separation,
supra note 141, at 33.
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separating from a man, the chances of violence against her escalate.' 99
The signing of a separation agreement and an appearance in court are
often the culmination of a long and difficult process of separation, a
time when judges should be most alert to signs of force, undue influ-
ence, or incapacity in some form. Instead, courts point to the likeli-
hood of stress and pain affecting the parties' judgment as the best
reason to ignore those factors. As one court noted, "If agreements
between husbands and wives could be set aside on the ground that one
of the parties was severely depressed.., agreements executed by per-
sons involved in dissolution or divorce proceedings would tumble like
pins in a bowling alley." 2"
It is not clear what social goal the insistent protection of these
agreements and contracts made under such inauspicious conditions
serves. However, when the clear underlying goal of courts in these
situations is to uphold these agreements, the party under the most
emotional pressure, the party with the least power, certainly stands to
lose even more if the courts refuse to look at the combination of all
her circumstances. Although courts are more willing to entertain the
notion of a woman's incapacity than a man's in challenges to dissolu-
tion agreements, holding "competent" women to these agreements is
a particularly punitive result of the competence/duress dichotomy
and the law's assumptions that each individual acts with total auton-
omy and free will.
C. Competence to Consent to the Adoption of a Child
The harm done by formally separating coercion and capacity
doctrines is apparent in an area where the courts have a strong prefer-
ence for finding capacity-the decision to give up a child for adoption.
In most states, revocation of consent for adoption, like invalidation of
a separation agreement, requires a showing of fraud, duress or coer-
cion.2° ' In these cases, a court's orientation to a particular outcome,
199. Mahoney, Issue of Separation, supra note 141, at 65-66.
200. DiPietro v. DiPietro, 460 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
201. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1513 (Smith-Hurd 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.312 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.33.160 (West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5 (1992). Even in states where a
biological parent may revoke consent without such a showing, statutes often confer a
significant preference in situations involving coercion and duress. For example in New York,
consent to adoption made in a judicial proceeding is immediately irrevocable. Consents signed
on documents become irrevocable after thirty days. If parents choose to revoke in thirty days,
the court holds a hearing to determine the best interests of the child. However, if parents
successfully claim fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of consent, the child may be
returned to the parents without such a hearing. See, e.g., In re Sarah K., 487 N.E.2d 241
(N.Y. 1985) (noting that revocation of consent in the absence of fraud and duress leads to
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and the extent to which the doctrinal division between coercion and
capacity assists desired outcomes is quite explicit.
For example, in one case a pregnant mother with an IQ of sixty
was in jail awaiting trial for fornication. °2 A Massachusetts agency
had brought neglect proceedings against her and sought to take cus-
tody of the children. She signed adoption consent forms giving up her
four children for adoption after a conversation with an adoption
agency representative that led her to believe she would be in jail for
two years. The next day, when she retained an attorney, she learned
that the maximum sentence for fornication was only three months.
She immediately filed to revoke her consent to the adoption. She
argued that she did not have the capacity to consent to the adoption,
or alternatively, that she had done so under duress. Although the
lower court had granted her petition, the appeals court reversed.20 3
Though the appeals court noted that she was classified as a
"moron,"2 °4 and few, if any, courts have ever found that a woman
with an IQ in this range has the capacity to consent to sexual inter-
course, the court nevertheless found that she did have capacity to give
her children up for adoption. The court held that "the mother under-
stood precisely what she was doing ... and acted for the paramount,
sound reason that she believed she would be confined for some time
and unable to care for her children. ' 20 5 She had capacity, therefore,
because she acted rationally on the basis of information available to
her even though that information was false.
As a separate matter, the court found that she had not acted
under duress because any misinformation from the agency was
neither deliberate nor "designed to overcome the mother's will and
compel assent. '20 6 Thus, the court considered the mother's retarda-
tion under the capacity rubric, but considered the misinformation
about the jail sentence under the duress rubric. The fact that she was
in jail and pregnant falls into no legal category at all because it is
neither inherent in her nor the bad or unlawful act of someone else.
In the end, the court held her to have acted voluntarily and compe-
tently in surrendering her children. If we simply ask the question of
whether she really exercised agency in signing the adoption consent
form, the answer looks a lot different.
hearing to determine best interests of child and that revocation of consent due to fraud and
coercion is tantamount to no consent at all, leading to return of child without further findings).
202. In re Surrender of Minor Children, 181 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1962).
203. Id. at 840.
204. Id. at 836.
205. Id. at 839.
206. Id.
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The division between capacity and duress is also made in another
case207 where the court, discussing capacity to consent to adoption
executed three days208 after the baby was born, noted that "the fact
that appellant was weakened by her recent delivery and depressed, as
all women would be under similar circumstances, does not constitute
duress. ' ' 20 9 The court did not consider this as a capacity argument at
all, because capacity is an individualized inquiry. If all women are
torn with emotions and stress when they give up their babies, then
those emotions and stress cannot constitute the basis for a capacity
inquiry. In considering the mother's argument, the court viewed her
confusion from the pain medication she was taking, as well as her
claim that her priest and the adoptive parents' attorney subjected her
to duress, as individualized factors. The court rejected both the medi-
cation argument, which went to capacity, and the duress arguments
as separate matters, under separate analyses, without ever considering
the synergistic effects of the depression, emotions, stress, medication
and the strong persuasion of her priest and the attorney together.
And yet issues of competence and duress interact with each other
in the reality of women's lives. But courts specifically refuse to con-
sider either the individual or cumulative effects of "parental threats,
pressure by the surrendering mother's family, advice by the surren-
dering parent's physician and mother, emotional distress or depres-
sion ' 210 as sufficient to constitute "the 'kind of force' which would
sustain a finding of duress. '211
The inability of competence and coercion doctrine to provide an
adequate remedy for women's injuries is illustrated in the case of
Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc.21 2 The plaintiff, Ms. Regenold, became
pregnant her senior year in high school. She and her husband lived
with her parents, who were in the process of a painful divorce and
fought constantly. After she had the baby, her husband refused to
work, and her mother demanded rent. Ms. Regenold found a job,
which she testified required her to do the work of three people. The
207. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530 P.2d 896 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
208. The applicable state statute had a seventy-two hour waiting period. Id. at 897. The
adopting parents' attorney obtained the woman's consent immediately after the waiting period
elapsed. The biological mother testified that she asked the adopting parents' attorney, "Does
this have to be done today?" and he replied, "Yes." Id. at 899. The court found that even if
the mother were telling the truth, this testimony "falls far short in our opinion, of showing that
at the time she released her child for adoption, she was acting under duress." Id.
209. Id. at 898 (emphasis added).
210. Father's Consent is Required Despite DRL § 111 Noncompliance, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 7,
1989 at 21.
211. Id.
212. 369 N.E.2d 858 (I1. 1977).
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court found her earnings to be insubstantial.21a From these earnings,
she paid day care and rent and tried to pay the hospital and doctor
bills for the delivery. Her husband moved out and she divorced him.
At the same time her mother complained that she did not pay enough
rent and warned her that she would have to leave when she sold the
house after her own divorce from Ms. Regenold's father.214 To make
matters worse, she developed a bad infection. Although she took
medication for the infection, her doctor told her that she might
require a partial hysterectomy.2 5 Ms. Regenold sought assistance at
public agencies but was unsuccessful. During this entire time, her
three year old brother, who was mentally retarded, was physically
attacking her baby.216
In October, Ms. Regenold went to defendant Baby Fold, a child
welfare agency, and poured out her problems. Baby Fold arranged
for her to sign papers giving up her child within two days of her first
visit. Approximately four days after that, sick with grief, she decided
to rescind the agreement and get her baby back.217 Although a psy-
chiatrist testified that when she signed the agreement she was under
such pressure that she did not have the capacity to make rational
judgments,18 the judge found that she neither lacked capacity, nor
had the agency exerted duress. Therefore, the court refused to rescind
the agreement. 219 The law presumed that Ms. Regenold was compe-
tent to make her decision, and there was insufficient proof of the
agency's misbehavior to constitute duress.220 There was and is simply
no remedy provided by law for Ms. Regenold.
As Professor Mahoney notes, "[c]ontemporary conservative
insistence on agency [from this article's point of view, the law's
assumptions about competence and competent women] treats self-
realization as a question of pure will, not constrained in any serious
way. '2 21 Neither the weight of Ms. Regenold's pain and oppression
nor her acts of strength are cognizable at law. The legal assumption
213. Id. at 860.
214. Id.
215. Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 355 N.E.2d 361, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
216. Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 369 N.E.2d at 860-61.
217. Id. at 862. In their decisions, neither the Appellate Court of Illinois, Regenold, 369
N.E.2d at 361, nor the Illinois Supreme Court, Regenold, 369 N.E.2d at 858, mentioned
anything about a time period to change one's mind. The relevant statute was changed
specifically to make adoptions irrevocable in the absence of fraud or duress by the person to
whom the baby was relinquished. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para 1513 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
218. Regenold, 359 N.E.2d at 862.
219. Id. at 868.
220. Id. at 865.
221. Mahoney, supra note 133, at 1314. Prof. Mahoney's analysis of "conservatism" is in
all ways consistent with my analysis of law.
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of her competence has nothing to do with her real acts of strength and
struggle to maintain her life-getting work, paying child-care, seeking
public assistance, filing litigation to reclaim her child. The legal
assumption of her competence results in denying her the legal remedy
she needs to get her child back. It thus robs her of power in one of the
most important situations in her life.
D. Competence to Decide to Have Children
Courts assume that decisions regarding child-bearing and sterili-
zation, like decisions about sexual intercourse, are the product of
autonomous and voluntary choice by competent women.222 However,
the conditions under which many women bear children or are steril-
ized, like the conditions under which many women have sex, are not
so easily characterized. Although women make many of these choices
freely, the continuum shades into a gray area of involuntariness and
coercion very quickly. The law does not adequately address or rem-
edy a woman's lack of agency in these areas. In either case, the cir-
cumstances are completely individualized. The doctrine that each
individual is presumed competent constructs a world of private atom-
istic individuals making voluntary and rational choices by selecting
among options available to them. Constraints are personal and pri-
vate and the law has nothing to do with them. Thus, women who, in
reality, are similarly situated are never considered as similar by law.
Women who are sterilized after a finding of incapacity by courts;223
women who are sterilized without their knowledge because they are
222. Despite the fact that many women experience their decisions to bear children as
intentionally interfered with by a variety of people, cases challenging such interference are
rare. The most prominent successful examples are the cases striking down statutes that
enshrine such interference in law, such as parental or spousal consent requirements in abortion
cases. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Intentional interference with a
woman's decision to have a child, while it happens both on an individual basis and as a matter
of social policy, is rarely legally constrained. A recent notable exception is Int'l Union, United
Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196
(1991) (striking down as sex discrimination a policy prohibiting fertile women from
employment in jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure).
223. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982); In re
Grady, 405 A.2d 851 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 1979), vacated, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981).
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poor,"' or mentally disabled, 2 5 or members of ethnic minorities;226
women who consented to sterilization under threat of losing medical
care or welfare benefits, 227 or as an alternative to a prison sentence;228
Native American229 and Puerto Rican women 230 whose choices might
224. MacKinnon, supra note 16, at 1301 n.94.
225. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-53 (1978); Chasse v. Mazerolle, 580 A.2d 155,
156 (Me. 1990); see also Gerber, supra note 78, at 7. Gerber notes a study of:
[One hundred] adult men and women who were discharged from a southern
Californian state mental institution in or around 1954, . . .premised on the
determination that each of these individuals was capable of holding a job and
hence, it was assumed, living independently. (Though they would not know it
until much later, almost all of them were sterilized as a condition for their release.
They were told they needed appendectomies).
Id. (emphasis added).
226. See, e.g., Carlos G. Velez-I, The Nonconsenting Sterilization of Mexican Women in Los
Angeles, in TWICE A MINORITY: MEXICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 235 (Margarita B. Melville
ed., 1980); Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of Property, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF
LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 23-24 (Martha A. Fineman and Nancy Thomalson
eds., 1991); Edward J. Spriggs, Jr., Comment, Involuntary Sterilization: An Unconstitutional
Menace to Minorities and the Poor, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127 (1974).
227. See, e.g., Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated as moot,
565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Interest in sterilization or Norplant as a criminal sanction for
child abuse or drug use by pregnant women is growing along with suggestions for the use of
Norplant in institutional settings or for women on welfare. See also Williams, supra note 226,
at 24 (discussing a case charging that chief of obstetrics at Los Angeles County General
Medical Center, "pursued a policy of recommending Caesarian delivery and simultaneous
sterilization for any pregnant woman with three or more children and who was on welfare.").
Id.
228. See, e.g., Michele Oberman, The Control of Pregnancy and the Criminalization of
Femaleness, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1992); Nancy K. Schiff, Legislation Punishing
Drug Use During Pregnancy: Attack on Women's Rights in the Name of Fetal Protection, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197 (1991); Thomas E. Bartrum, Note, Birth Control as a Condition of
Probation-A New Weapon in the War Against Child Abuse, 80 KY. L.J. 1037 (1991/92);
Tamar Lewin, Implanted Birth Control Device Renews Debate Over Forced Contraception, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20.
229. Williams, supra note 226, at 24 ("[O]ne quarter of all Navajo women of childbearing
age-literally all those of childbearing age ever admitted to a hospital-have been sterilized");
see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT
326 (1990) (discussing involuntary sterilization of Indian women); Richard Delgado, Derrick
Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L. J. 923, 939 n. 101
(1988); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights
Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660,
692-93 n.113 (noting federal government's defense of involuntary sterilization of Indian
women).
230. Compulsory sterilization was legal in Puerto Rico from 1937-1980. HARRIET B.
PRESSER, STERILIZATION AND FERTILITY DECLINE IN PUERTO RIco 6 n.2 (1973). Over
thirty percent of married women in Puerto Rico were sterilized as of 1984. Claude Robinson,
Population: U.N. Study Cites Rapid Increase in Contraceptive Use, Inter Press Service, July 30,
1984 available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library. Furthermore,
While it is difficult to prove that the choice. . . was not voluntary, it can
nevertheless be argued that this choice was conditioned and constrained by the
surrounding social framework. Medical authority, eugenist ideology, machismo,
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look voluntary and autonomous examined individually but who are
obtaining sterilizations at massively disproportionate rates to white
women; and women who (until recently) worked for Johnson Con-
trols or American Cyanamid 231 -most of these women probably did
not experience sterilization as an act of agency, voluntariness, or even
as a choice among available options.
Decisions regarding capacity to have children or to be sterilized
make more sense considered in the following context. First, these
decisions are never before the court because a mentally disabled or
poor woman has expressed the desire to be sterilized (or to have an
abortion) and some doubt exists about her capacity to decide not to
have a child.232 One can map a social landscape with substantial
restricted employment opportunities, and lack of other birth control alternatives
were all factors that limited women's options.
ANNETTE B. RAMIREZ DE ARELLANO AND CONRAD SEIPP, COLONIALISM, CATHOLICISM
AND CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN PUERTO Rico 144 (1983) (foot-
notes omitted).
231. International Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 11 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (striking down a policy prohibiting fertile
women from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure because such policy is facially
discriminatory and not a bona fide occupational qualification); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers
Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding a policy
requiring the sterilization or resignation of fertile female employees who may be exposed to
lead).
232. When voluntary sterilizations and abortions of women of dubious capacity come to
light, it is often through cases before the court in another context. See, e.g., In re Burbanks,
3 10 N.W.2d 138 (Neb. 1981). This case involved the termination of parental rights where the
court found that the director of a multi county social service unit:
[A]ssisted in the processing of legal instruments executed by the allegedly
mentally deficient parents to authorize Shiela [the mother] to have an abortion
and for Shiela to be sterilized. The abortion did take place. The director testified
that the sterilization did not. However, there is other evidence in the record that
it may have taken place. At what time and on whose initiative does not appear.
The director testified that Shiela understood what she was signing.
Id. at 151.
The court searched the statutes to determine whether any welfare agency in Nebraska was
authorized to engage in such activities and found no such authorization. Id.; see also State v.
Green, No. C.C.A. 01-C-01-9002-CC-00045, 1990 Crim. App. LEXIS 653 at *9 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Oct. 3, 1990) *9 (involving man charged with assault with intent to commit sexual bat-
tery on a woman in a nursing home who was allegedly incompetent to consent to sexual rela-
tions where the court considered evidence that, inter alia, the woman was considered
competent to consent to a tubal ligation which had taken place earlier). Many of these situa-
tions also come to light when a woman sues for having been coerced into consenting to sterili-
zation. See, e.g., McCullough v. Allen, 449 N.E.2d 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). In
McCullough, the court noted that
Linda voluntarily entered Floyd County Hospital on April 30, 1970, to have a
baby. The hospital records for May 1, 1970, show Linda was anxious and suspi-
cious of the staff after delivery, and was given Thorazine [a powerful psycho-
tropic drug]. On this same day, Linda signed a consent to a tubal ligation. Linda
later alleged [Dr.] McCullough coerced her into signing this consent form.
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accuracy by looking at the decisions that result in the questioning of
the decisionmaker's competence, as well as the "decisions" that are
never questioned. The cases involving assessment of capacity for pur-
poses of sterilization or abortion come before courts for one of two
reasons: either a third party wishes to arrange for a woman's sterili-
zation or to abort her pregnancy,233 or the woman wishes to have a
child.234
These cases are often framed in terms of protection of the incom-
petent woman or girl who is to be sterilized.2 35 In order to demon-
strate a lack of capacity sufficient to justify sterilization without
consent, these cases focus on the woman's lack of understanding
about both sex and pregnancy.236 At the same time, the courts clearly
assume that the woman will have sex, since otherwise sterilization
would not be necessary. Thus, courts implicitly-and sometimes even
explicitly-acknowledge that the allegedly incompetent woman will
be subject to sexual abuse or rape.237 For example, in one case the
Id. at 1169.
In Flateau v. Thom, 393 So. 2d 392 (La. Ct. App. 1980), the court notes that, "Plaintiffs urge
that Mrs. Flateau was 'pressured, coerced and humiliated without her legal, valid and compe-
tent informed consent, to be sterilized'...." Id. at 392-93. In another interesting case, an
institutionalized woman claimed that "she denied pregnancy at the Ancora hearing because
she believed its doctors would force her to have an examination which she did not want and
might force her to have an abortion." In re D.K., 497 A.2d 1298, 1301 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
1985). According to doctors, "[p]rior to the hearing she told her doctors that she wanted an
abortion," but at the hearing "she said she was opposed to an abortion, while acknowledging
the difficulties which the birth of a child would present." Id. at 1300.
233. See McKinney v. McKinney, 805 S.W.2d 66 (Ark. 1991) (involving adult's request to
restrain her father from forcing her to undergo involuntary sterilization permitted by statute);
Motes v. Hall County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 306 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. 1983)
(involving county welfare department that sought to sterilize woman); Lulos v. State, 548
N.E.2d 173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (involving adoptive parents who sought sterilization of
incompetent adult daughter); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968) (involving a
county health officer and local medical society that sought a declaratory judgment that they
could sterilize without civil or criminal liability a thirty-five year old mentally retarded
woman); Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 447 A.2d 1244 (Md. 1982) (involving
grandmother and aunt who sought a hysterectomy for mentally retarded thirteen year old girl
in their care).
234. See In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 824 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (noting desire of
incompetent woman to remain capable of having children); Lefebvre v. North Broward Hosp.
Dist. 566 So. 2d 568, 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (per curiam) (noting that mentally ill woman
who was nine and one half weeks pregnant refused to consent to an abortion).
235. P.S. by Harvin v. W.S., 452 N.E.2d 969, 972 (Ind. 1983); Lulos, 548 N.E.2d at 173.
236. E.g., In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 367 (Colo. 1981); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 470 (N.J.
1981); see also In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 608 (Alaska 1981) (focusing on woman's inability
to make responsible decisions and prevent pregnancy).
237. E.g., In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d at 608; P.S. by Harbin, 452 N.E. 2d at 972; see also In re
Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 806 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (requiring a showing that the mentally
incompetent woman "will voluntarily or otherwise engage in sexual activity") (emphasis
added).
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court found that "[t]here was evidence showing that the guardianship
petition [to sterilize a thirteen year old girl] was motivated by a sin-
cere desire to free [the girl] of the pain and other consequences suf-
fered by her during menstruation and because of genuine concern that
[she] was an easy subject for rape and resulting pregnancy. "238 In
other words, courts that justify sterilization because a woman is
incompetent to understand the meaning of sex assume that the men-
tally retarded woman will be raped.
Even more ironically, most courts have framed these involuntary
sterilization orders as compelled by the woman's constitutional right
of freedom to control her own reproduction. 239 Thus, the law sets up
a system that assumes that women who cannot understand sex will be
raped, and that decrees nonconsensual surgical intrusion to prevent
pregnancy as a vindication of such women's reproductive rights.24
When these women are raped, as happens frequently,24' courts order
abortions as further vindications of their reproductive rights.242
Disabled women who decide to have children do not have their
reproductive rights attended to so scrupulously. When Denise
Lefebvre discovered she was pregnant, she stopped taking her lithium
because she knew the medication might harm the fetus.243 She clearly
expressed that the reason for discontinuing her medication was to
protect her child from the risk of birth defects associated with lith-
ium. In the absence of medication, her condition deteriorated rapidly
and she was hospitalized. The hospital sought to abort the fetus
despite her express wishes to the contrary. As her court-appointed
attorney said, "This woman is very lucid regarding her baby . . .
everyone wanted to give her an abortion except her.' ' 2 " The trial
court ignored her consistently expressed wishes both before and after
she was hospitalized.24 The trial court found that at the time of the
238. Wentzel v. Montgomery County Gen. Hosp., 447 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Md. 1982).
239. E.g., Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 772 (Cal. 1985) (en banc); In re
Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719-720 (Mass. 1982); In re Grady, 426 A.2d at 474-75.
240. Catharine MacKinnon makes a similar observation about the framing of the right to
abortion as a woman's constitutional right to privacy, when, as long as nonconsensual sex is
common, abortion can appear to merely facilitate a man's sexual access to a woman without
his having to assume responsibility for the resulting pregnancy. CATHERINE MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 190 (1989); see also Stefan, supra note 87, at
413-27.
241. E.g., In re Doe, 533 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1987) (per curiam); Lisa Belkin, Grim Crossroads:
Rape, Retardation and Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1990, at B20; see also In re Moe, 432
N.E.2d at 715 n.I (referring to woman's experience as a "sexual incident").
242. In re Doe, 533 A.2d at 525-26.
243. Lefebvre v. North Broward Gen. Hosp., 566 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
244. Psychotic's Pregnancy Stirs Legal Fight, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 1990, at 9.
245. Lefebvre, 566 So. 2d at 570.
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hearing she "was not capable of consenting or objecting to the termi-
nation [of her pregnancy] due to her psychotic condition," '246 a condi-
tion that resulted precisely because she wished to safeguard the health
of the fetus.247
Another example of a judge's inability to comprehend decision-
making that does not follow accepted rational calculations involved a
woman, LaVista Romero, who objected to the sterilization proposed
by her guardian because she wished to remain capable of having a
child.24 She had a diabetic condition that rendered pregnancy medi-
cally risky. At her hearing, the court found that she testified in an
articulate manner, understood the consequences of sterilization and
wanted to remain capable of having another child.24 9 A psychiatrist
testified that Ms. Romero was not competent to consent to steriliza-
tion because she was "subject to rapid changes in mood, has poor
social judgment, has episodes of anger and apathy, is sometimes para-
noid, and has difficulty thinking abstractly. ' 250  According to the
court, the only justification the psychiatrist offered for this conclusion
was that Ms. Romero "doesn't look at things in terms of future conse-
quences."25 The Colorado Supreme Court denied the petition to
sterilize Ms. Romero, with three justices dissenting strongly.252 The
dissent quoted the following language from the trial transcript to sup-
port its position that Ms. Romero was incompetent:
Q. You've told us that you want to have a child.
A. Yes.
Q. And the doctors have been telling me here today in the hear-
ing that that would be very dangerous for you to do. In fact,
it could be threatening to your health, or even to your life.
Did you hear that testimony?
A. Yes.
246. Id.
247. The appellate court reversed the decision because the lower court had not followed the
appropriate statutory procedure in appointing a guardian for the woman. Id. at 571. By the
time the decision was reversed, however, the time for an abortion was past. The woman had
her son, who was promptly removed from her care. Baby Born After Abortion May Be Up for
Adoption, CH1. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1991 at 3. She later lost custody of the child. Mental Patient
Abortion U.S.A. TODAY, July 11, 1991 at 3A.
248. In Re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 824 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). The case was before the
court because Romero's mother, her guardian, had petitioned to have her sterilized. Her
mother had been her guardian since Ms. Romero suffered brain damage from oxygen
deprivation associated with diabetes complications four years earlier. Id. at 820.
249. Id. at 823-24.
250. Id. at 824.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 824-27.
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Q. Does that make you feel maybe you should be more cautious
or maybe you shouldn't have a baby because of what they
said?
A. No.
Q. Why is that?
A. Because I want one bad enough.
Q. Realizing that it could even kill you?
A. Yes, sir.253
The next line of the dissent reads: "[i]t appears that Romero could
not connect her diabetic condition with the risks of pregnancy and
childbirth. 254
There is a spectrum of capacity to make decisions, and of agency
expressed by decisions, as well as a spectrum of state involvement and
constraint on decisionmaking. To the extent that competence doc-
trine considers women with mental disabilities who want to have chil-
dren or for whom sterilizations are recommended by third parties
incapacitated, while considering most poor or minority women who
obtain sterilizations free agents with individual choice, it obscures the
enormous commonality shared by these women. Whether a woman is
mentally disabled, on welfare, pregnant and charged with drug abuse,
a Native American, or a woman of color, her capacity to make deci-
sions regarding childbearing may matter less than the fact that those
with economic, political and social authority and power do not want
her to have children. The collective efforts made to prevent childbear-
ing by women in these disfavored categories are obscured because the
law has no name for such efforts. When those efforts fail, the machin-
ery of society stands poised to remove the children born to these
women from their mothers, although studies year after year demon-
strate that the removal is generally detrimental to the children. 255
V. CONCLUSION
Competence doctrine assumes unconstrained autonomy on the
part of atomized individuals acting in a social vacuum. The flaw of
competence doctrine is not only that it fails to recognize the condition
of women in this society. By treating powerless people as though they
253. Id. at 826 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., MaryLee Allen et al., Federal Legislative Support for Independent Living, 67
CHILD WELFARE 515 (1988) (detailing federal legislative developments and activities
establishing independent living for adolescents in foster care); Norma Blank, Reunification
Planning for Children in Custody of Ohio's Children Services Boards: What Does the Law
Require?, 16 AKRON L. REV. 681 (1983) (discussing Ohio's intervention and reunifications
policies).
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possess equal agency, it enforces and strengthens inequality and
oppression and makes legal remedies for these conditions
inconceivable.
I propose that competence questions be refocused on whether the
woman--or any person subject to competence inquiry-was exercis-
ing agency when she acted; whether she was "functioning as a deci-
sion-maker, acting in accordance with her preferences and values. '256
If the law were consciously reformulated to support acts of agency, to
promote autonomy rather than assume it, to effectuate preferences
and values, rape law would recognize "no" as sufficient to mean "no"
for all women, not just women who were held to lack decisionmaking
capacity. The law would reflect what we all know: that the "yes" of
the mentally retarded mother in jail and Ms. Regenold and the
woman in State v. Rhone 2. were not expressions of power but of
powerlessness.
As it is now, competence inquiry, assessment, and judgment are
made by those in authority pursuant to their own values. Compe-
tence doctrine takes that power and those values as immutable, invisi-
ble givens, which simply form part of the legal landscape against
which presumptively autonomous individuals make rational deci-
sions. Feminist theory must bring the pain and loss of that legal land-
scape to life, and rename its landmarks according to the reality of our
lives.
256. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990).
257. 566 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
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